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Abigail Lantz: Mainstreaming the Far-Right: The Use of Anti-Migrant Frames in Sweden and 
France  
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
This thesis explores the mainstreaming of far-right anti-migrant frames in Sweden and 
France. Using frame analysis, the thesis documents when three frames transferred from the 
manifestos of far-right to mainstream parties across three elections. The thesis also examines 
how discursive opportunities, specifically the visibility of migration, and political context, 
specifically differences in voter competition and political systems, impacted the transfer of 
frames. The material includes manifestos published by center, center-right, and far-right 
parties between 2007-2018 and supplementary data published between 2002-2019, including 
immigration statistics, vote margins, and party GAL-TAN scores. The thesis concludes that in 
Sweden, far-right frames did not appear in center-right manifestos in 2010 or 2014, but 
transferred by 2018. In France, far-right frames appeared in center-right manifestos in 2007 
and 2012, but less by 2017. The thesis also finds that in both countries, differences in political 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Far-right frames, or interpretations of issues and events by far-right actors intended to 
shift public opinion, are becoming identifiable in mainstream political discourse across 
Europe, perceptible even in the platforms of mainstream political parties. Concurrently, far 
right political parties, or parties with culturally traditional, authoritarian, nativist, and/or 
nationalist platforms, are winning greater voting margins across Europe. As they rise to 
power, far-right parties are encroaching on the voter base of mainstream parties, modernizing 
their extremist stances and minimizing their historical associations with the extreme right to 
appeal to a greater number of voters (Downes 2020). Mainstream parties, particularly center 
and center-right parties, are responding to the broadening voter appeal of the far-right by 
reacting to their positions, taking on pieces of far-right platforms, and even rejecting liberal 
democratic values at the core of their belief systems (Downes 2020). In Europe, the gradual 
acceptance of far-right frames by mainstream political parties is observable across the 
continent. Previous research demonstrates that mainstream European political parties 
perceived increased competition over voters from far-right parties and adopted far-right 
frames around migration in response to both increased party competition and the arrival of 
high rates of migrants in Europe between 2014 and 2019 (Downes and Loveless 2018). While 
scholars have explored the impact of far-right frames on political outcomes for far-right 
parties (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2008; Ellinas 2010; Elgenius and Rydgren 2019; Rooduijn 
2020), few have addressed how framing processes, discursive opportunities,1 and differences 
in political context enable far-right frames to enter the political mainstream. 
 
1 “Discursive opportunities” are “the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s diffusion in the 
public sphere” (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 202). This concept will be further explained on page 17.  
2 
 
Mainstreaming, the route by which information enters the popular dialogue or “the 
major current of opinion,” is a dynamic process involving a wide range of participants 
(Picciotto 2002: 322) It is an injection of new information into the “dominant culture” based 
on what is deemed publicly acceptable (Picciotto 2002: 322). While the mainstreaming of 
once-radical political issues like gender equity and environmentalism is well-documented, 
this process has not yet been broadly applied to the far-right. However, the phenomenon is 
evident today. Far-right frames, which are often anti-migrant, anti-elite, or xenophobic 
narratives around events, are repeated by media and mainstream politicians. Far-right media 
stories, published by far-right publications, are amplified or quoted by mainstream media 
outlets and politicians. Burgeoning crises are framed by far-right ideologues and the 
narratives are picked up or built upon by mainstream media and politicians. As a result, the 
far-right influences bystanders and accumulates adherents, growing both its voter base and its 
ability to influence the greater current of public opinion as mainstream parties and politicians 
shift positions in response to the threat of voter loss (Downes and Loveless 2018; Rooduijn 
2020).  
Far right parties have become the fastest growing party family in Europe (Golder 
2016; Bieber 2019). “In the past sixty years, no other party family has managed to make such 
significant electoral advances across so many countries in such a short time” (Ellinas 2010: 
4). In Europe the 2000 breakthrough of the far-right Freedom Party in Austria and the 2001 
entrance of the Danish People’s Party into a legislative agreement with the current 
government heralded the ascendance of a host of far-right parties previously shunned and 
derided for espousing what were perceived as extremist, fringe views (Biswas 2020). Far-
right parties are now amassing the largest voting returns seen in Europe since WWII (Biswas 
2020). Unable to ignore the electoral clout of the far-right and desperate to maintain their 
voting margins, center and center-right parties in Europe are starting to accede to and form 
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coalitions with far-right parties, coopting and responding to their priority issues, and 
informally breaking the cordon sanitaire, an unspoken agreement among mainstream parties 
in many European countries to isolate and exclude the far-right (Chini 2019).  
Mainstream parties in Europe are even changing their core ideological values and 
central aspects of their political platforms in response to the stances and frames of far-right 
parties. In historically migrant-tolerant Sweden, mainstream political parties sharply 
restricted immigration in 2016, responding to an increase in migration rates but also to 
growing political pressure by the far-right Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) 
(Schroeder 2019). In France, the political mainstream has similarly acceded political ground 
to the far right. Emmanuel Macron, who ran as a “radical centrist,” awarded a rare interview 
to a far-right media organization in 2019 and presented legislation in December 2020 
requiring federal oversight of mosques partially in response to criticism from France’s far-
right Rassemblement National (National Rally) party and “to distract from his unpopular 
economic reforms” (Piser 2019: 1). The electoral success of far-right parties and politicians 
and their influence on the mainstream in Europe does not appear to be a fleeting trend.  
The far-right maintains a growing voice in the mainstream political and media debate 
in Europe. Scholarship on the mainstreaming of far-right frames in European countries may 
encourage greater understanding of how this trend will impact mainstream European politics. 
One common perspective in the literature is that the so-called “migration crisis” transformed 
Europe politically and that the mainstreaming of far-right frames around migration is in part 
due to the arrival of thousands of migrants in Europe (Traar 2018). This thesis seeks to 
examine whether the “migration crisis” alone really did “change everything” or whether the 
transfer of far-right frames to the political manifestos of mainstream parties was also 
significantly impacted by differing political contexts in each country, such as differing levels 
of voter competition by the far-right or differences in political structures (Traar 2018: 1). 
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1.1 Research Aim and Question 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the following questions:  
1. When and how were far-right anti-migrant frames incorporated in the platforms of center 
and center-right parties in France and Sweden? 
2. How did discursive opportunities that arose as a response to an increase in migration, and 
differing political contexts in each country, impact the mainstreaming of far-right anti-
migrant frames by center and center-right parties in France and Sweden? 
The study examines the mainstreaming of far-right anti-migrant frames in two 
cases—Sweden and France—to understand the general trend of how far-right frames enter 
the political mainstream in Europe. These case studies were selected because both are EU 
countries with strong far-right political parties. Both countries also accepted a large number 
of migrants during the height of the increase in migration. Given the impact of the increase in 
migration in Sweden and France, it is relevant to examine whether discursive opportunities 
provoked by the crisis, such as increased visibility of migrants and the migration issue, may 
have impacted the transfer of far-right frames. However, there are also important differences 
between France and Sweden. Between 1986 and 2007 in France, the far-right Front National 
party consistently won over ten percent of the vote and in 2002, won 17 percent in the 
national presidential election which advanced the party to the second round (Marthaler 2008). 
By contrast, Sweden did not have a strong far-right party until 2010, when the Sweden 
Democrats entered the political scene. Additionally, both countries have different political 
systems. France has a semi-presidential and majoritarian political system. To win election, 
the presidential candidate must obtain a national majority in the first or second round and 
unlike a parliamentary system, the executive is not responsible to the legislature. In the 
Presidential election, the top two candidates from the first round compete against one another 
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in a final run-off.2 By contrast, Sweden has a parliamentary and proportional political system, 
where executive power resides in a Prime Minister rather than a President and legislative 
power is split evenly between the executive and legislature. Given the difference in political 
systems and historical strength of the far-right party, it is relevant to investigate whether 
different political contexts in the two countries could have impacted the transfer of far-right 
frames during the time period under study.  
The period of time selected, 2007 to 2019, spans three most recent elections in each 
country (in France, 2007, 2012, and 2017 and in Sweden, 2010, 2014, and 2018) and includes 
a period of increasing migration, culminating in the so-called “migration crisis.” The material 
studied, political party manifestos, was selected because these documents reflect political 
party framing of immigration in these elections. By examining the incorporation of far-right 
frames by center and center-right political parties after an election, it is possible to assess how 
each party responded to increased or decreased competition by the far-right in the previous 
election. Data on far-right competition are provided for the election that occurred prior to the 
publication of the initial political manifesto (2002 in France and 2006 in Sweden). Data on 
migration for Europe from 2008 to 2019 are available from Eurostat (Eurostat 2021). These 
data allow assessment of increasing visibility from the impact of increasing migration and the 
“migration crisis” on party framing. One criticism may be made of the time period selected. 
The far-right in France won a significant electoral victory in 2002, but the far-right, center, 
and center-right political manifestos in the 2002 election in France are not included in this 
thesis due to time constraints. However, the success of the far-right in France in 2002 is a 
factor of note in analyzing the center-right manifesto in 2007.  
 
 
2 The French parliamentary elections also follow a two round model, though this thesis focuses specifically on 




To analyze how far-right frames have entered the mainstream, I begin by exploring 
previous research on the far-right, on mainstream and far-right political parties, on the 
response of mainstream parties to the political ascendance of the far-right, and on the 
mainstreaming of far-right frames.  Next, I describe and apply framing theory and review 
prior applications in a political party context. To examine how far-right frames are 
mainstreamed, I analyze two case studies: France and Sweden. For my analysis, I initially 
document when three far-right frames appeared in far-right political party manifestos in both 
countries and track when and how these anti-migrant far-right frames transferred to 
mainstream center and center-right party platforms. Next, I examine two independent 
variables that may have impacted the transfer of far-right frames in each country. First, I 
analyze a discursive opportunity, visibility, that may have arisen as a result of migration rates 
during the time period under study. Second, I examine the impact of political context in each 
country, specifically examining vote margins and GAL-TAN scores, to assess whether 
differences in political context changed the incorporation of far-right frames by center and 
center-right parties. Finally, I underscore the implications of far-right frame mainstreaming in 










CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The mainstreaming of far-right frames, and the far-right itself, is a nebulous and 
difficult phenomenon to study. The first part of this section describes existing research on the 
far-right in Europe by examining the various definitions of the term far-right and outlining 
the difference between the far-right and the extreme right. The second part of the section 
describes existing research on mainstream and far-right political parties in Europe, given that 
the thesis analyzes the party platforms of both mainstream and far-right parties in Sweden 
and France, and research on how mainstream political parties have responded to the far-right. 
The third part of the section reviews existing research on far-right frames and the 
mechanisms by which far-right frames enter the mainstream.  
2.1 The Far-Right  
Academics disagree on which term fits the far-right’s wide-ranging spectrum of 
ideologies. The far-right pursues a range of goals using distinctly different means, and is 
referred to variously in the literature as “the extreme right, right wing, radical right, right 
wing radicalism, right wing extremism, right wing terrorism, white power, white nationalism, 
white supremacism, white separatism…counter-jihadism…identitarianism, racially and 
ethnically motivated extremism, alt right and alt lite” (Miller Idriss 2020: 15). In an extensive 
description of the various definitions applied to the term far-right, far-right researcher Cas 
Mudde notes that only five characteristics are mentioned across twenty-six academic 
definitions: “nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong [or 
authoritarian] state” (Mudde 2000: 1). 
Most frequently, the term “far-right” refers to individuals or groups with ideological 
and political beliefs that fall to the right of center-right parties on the left-right political
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spectrum. The concepts “left” and “right” were established in 1789 during the French 
Revolution, when traditionalist French supporters of a royal legislative veto sat on the right of 
the National Assembly floor, with their opponents to the left (Mavrogordatos 1987). Based 
on this historical interpretation, which has changed over time but remains an accepted 
political concept, the right, as the privileged class, supported cultural traditionalism, 
hierarchy and the maintenance of the status quo (Mavrogordatos 1987). The left favored 
change, progression and equality. The far-right, in this scaffolding, supports a return to 
traditional values, cultural conservatism, and what it perceives as natural hierarchies among 
individuals (Miller Idriss 2020).  
The far-right does not align neatly with the government intervention and economics-
based left-right spectrum proposed by Anthony Downs in his landmark spatial model of party 
competition (Downs 1957). Downs’ model maintains that political parties are actors in a 
spatial field and that they that change their position in relation to one another in order to win 
votes (Downs 1957). According to Downs, parties in a dual-party or majoritarian system 
often move toward the center to reflect the position of the median voter, while parties in a 
parliamentary or multiparty system are more likely to polarize away from one another 
(Magni-Berton & Panel 2017).3 Based on Downs’ model, as a far-right party in a presidential 
or semi-presidential majoritarian system becomes more competitive politically, it is therefore 
likely that the party’s political manifestos will increasingly reflect the preferences of the 
median voter (Magni-Berton & Panel 2017). In a parliamentary or proportional political 
system, as the far-right becomes more competitive politically, it is likely that the far-right 
party will become increasingly disparate ideologically from other parties as it attempts to win 
votes (Magni-Berton & Panel 2017).  
 
3 With its two round presidential run off, France’s semi-presidential system mimics a two party system, despite 
the fact that the country has multiple political parties. As the final run off is essentially a two party competition, 
the system should move candidates toward the preferences of the median voter based on Downs’ model.  
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Downs interprets “left” and “right” based on receptiveness to government 
intervention. He describes the left as parties in support of “complete political control of the 
economy” and the right as parties in support of “no government interventions beyond the 
most limited state operations” (Stokes 1963: 368). As a result, far-right parties and groups 
largely do not adhere to Downs’ concept of left and right. Far-right parties cannot be easily 
mapped in a spatial field that focuses on differences in preference toward government 
intervention because they are often authoritarian-leaning, which makes them favor 
government intervention as a solution to problems. These parties can be distrustful of 
government intervention in some cases, but usually when it comes from a supranational body 
(such as Euroskepticism). Unlike parties on the right of Downs’ economic intervention-based 
model, far-right parties often openly support welfare policies with populist4 appeal. However, 
unlike parties on the left side of the Downs’ model, far-right parties are also culturally 
conservative, and prioritize cultural issues at the expense of economic issues. Therefore, far-
right parties are not easily mapped onto Downs’ model, falling somewhere in between right- 
and left-wing parties. Instead of focusing primarily on issues relating to economic 
intervention, “the defining characteristic of right-wing populist parties is that they take strong 
conservative and nationalist positions and emphasize traditional cultural and moral values, 
national self-interest and identity, and authority” (Bayerlein 2021: 3).  
A new political model, introduced by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson in 2002, better 
explains the position of far-right parties in relation to mainstream parties. The variable 
introduced by these researchers, GAL-TAN, juxtaposes parties that are 
green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) with parties that are traditional/authoritarian/nationalist 
(TAN). New scholarship claims that this model is more explanatory, as modern parties are 
 
4 Mudde describes populists, in an interview, as individuals who want to “split society into ‘two homogenous 
and antagonistic groups: the pure people on the one end and the corrupt elite on the other’ (Friedman 2017: 1).  
Populists often say they’re guided by the ‘will of the people.’” (Friedman 2017: 1).  
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“moving beyond left vs right as the hard, economic cleavage over redistribution begins to 
lose relative importance in the political landscape to one combining confrontations over 
immigration, minority rights, environmental policy, the role of traditions, and authority” 
(Filip 2019: 4). The new spatial model reflects a purported cultural divide that is taking 
precedent over the economic intervention-based model proposed by Downs (Filip 2019). On 
a scale of 1-10, far-right parties fall towards the higher end of the GAL-TAN scale, rated as 
traditional and authoritarian, while the lower end of the scale delineates parties that are 
libertarian or post materialist (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002).  
Far-right groups often advocate for a return to the traditional past, the importance of 
“lines of superiority and inferiority, according to race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion 
and sexuality,” and nationalist or nativist claims to citizenship (Miller Idriss 2020: 5). There 
are varying uses of criteria to define who belongs within the “in-group,” such as in countries 
like the Netherlands or France, where far-right political parties advocate for the protection of 
rights for women and LGBTQ individuals in an attempt to distance themselves from Islam, 
which they see as incompatible with national values. (Miller Idriss 2020). However, in most 
cases, far-right ideology invokes elements of nationalism,5 nativism,6 and even 
civilizationism, or the concept of a shared Western transnational cultural heritage that must 
be preserved and protected. The far right in France and the Netherlands views acceptance, 
secularism, and open-mindedness as a traditional national value to be protected and 
 
5 Nationalism is the concept that the state should belong to the individuals of a particular nation, and is 
associated with political action to achieve that goal. Máiz defines nationalism as a feature of a “community” 
with shared ethnicity that pursues similar national interests and a collective identity that inevitably “demands the 
right to self-determination and the establishment of a state that ensures self-government” (Máiz 2003: 196).  
While “nationalism exists wherever individuals feel they belong primarily to the nation, and whenever affective 
attachment and loyalty to that nation override all other attachments and loyalties,” “the essence of nationalism is 
the goal of national flourishing [and that] nationalists are people who identify with their historical group and 
want it to flourish’” (Millard 2014:  4).  
 
 
6 Nativism has been defined by far-right scholar Cas Mudde in an interview as “xenophobic nationalism” that 
“wants congruence of state and nation—the political and the cultural unit. It wants one state for every nation and 
one nation for every state” (Friedman 2017: 1). 
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conserved by the “true citizens” of the country, excluding individuals who have conflicting 
beliefs and therefore do not belong. Far-right groups or political parties frequently display 
xenophobia alongside nativism and nationalism. They often refer to two primary enemies, 
combining elements of populism and nationalism: the “other,” which is usually a “non-
governmental or external threat (e.g. immigrants)” that menaces the community, state or 
people, and the “establishment,” which is an “internal enemy (e.g. the “traitors” in 
government and the political establishment)” that betrays the community it claims to operate 
on behalf of (Ravndal and Bjørgo 2018: 6). Compared to a traditional mainstream political 
platform with a wide-range of stances on various political issues, the far-right usually 
prioritizes a few key issues—often immigration, security, corruption and foreign policy 
(Mudde 2019). All four of these issues are rooted in these parties’ core characteristics of 
nativism, nationalism, traditionalism and hierarchical exclusion.  
While the far-right generally upholds cultural traditionalism, it often favors 
authoritarian-leaning7 government structures. Some far-right thinkers “espouse beliefs that 
are antidemocratic [and] antiegalitarian,” promoting illiberal or authoritarian solutions to 
solve priority issues like immigration through “ethnic cleansing or ethnic migration, and the 
establishment of separate ethno-states or enclaves along racial and ethnic lines” (Miller Idriss 
2020: 7). However, “the entire far-right does not share belief in all of these elements equally” 
and “in recent years there has been a tactical shift towards trying to undermine government 
from within” (Miller Idriss 2020: 5). In some circumstances, the far-right favors political 
 
7 Authoritarians “implement tough security measures against threats from outsiders, promote a nativist brand of 
nationalism, demonstrate little tolerance of multiculturalism, and exercise a concentrated form of power 
involving strong, charismatic leadership” (Friedman 2017: 1). Comparative political scientists describe 
authoritarianism as “a regime that does not organize periodic free and fair elections” (Glasius 2018: 516).  
 
 
However, even if individuals with “authoritarian psychological profiles” rise to power through democratic 
mechanisms, they can pursue authoritarian practices or “a pattern of actions, embedded in an organized context, 
sabotaging accountability to people (‘the forum’) over whom a political actor exerts control, or their 
representatives, by disabling their access to information and/or disabling their voice (Glasius 2018: 516-527). 
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ascendance via democratic means.  In other cases, far-right parties and far-right individuals 
are willing to forgo democracy altogether. It is often a combination of both, depending on the 
expediency of the mechanism at hand and the probability of electoral success. Generally, the 
far-right is characterized by political authoritarianism and disrespect for the rule of law: 
“threatening hallmarks like free and fair elections; systems of checks and balances; the 
protection of individual freedom; the rule of law; and freedoms of the press, religion, speech 
and assembly” (Miller Idris 2020: 4).  
Within this broad category of “far-right,” researchers Jacob Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo 
refer to two separate groups—the radical far-right and the extreme far-right, based on 
Mudde’s 2002 landmark work (Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo 2018). While both the radical far-
right and the extreme far-right are characterized by cultural traditionalism, authoritarian and 
nativist tendencies, and the belief that “social inequality—and corresponding social 
hierarchies—[are] inevitable, natural, or even desirable,” the radical right chooses to work 
within existing democratic political frameworks to achieve its goals, while the extreme right 
rejects the confines of democratic mechanisms alone and encourages violence to achieve its 
goals (Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo 2018). However, there is notable tactical overlap between 
these two groups, as demonstrated by President Donald Trump, who was fairly elected within 
the bounds of a democratic political system, but frequently openly and tacitly encouraged 
violence among his supporters to achieve his political goals. Acknowledging the intersections 
among all the groups that fit within the category “far-right,” is essential to understanding the 
movement’s diversity.   
In this study, I will use the term “far-right” to refer to ideological beliefs and frames 
that are characterized by cultural traditionalism, nativism/nationalism/xenophobia, and 
hierarchical and exclusionary belief systems. By this definition, the far-right leans toward 
achieving goals through authoritarian solutions or anti-democratic means, even if they happen 
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to be working through democratic frameworks. Existing research supports this definition—in 
their 2018 literature review, Ravndal and Bjørgo note that “far-right may thus be used as a 
collective term comprising both (democratic) radicals and (anti-democratic) extremists, who 
all share three key features: acceptance of social inequality, authoritarianism, and nativism” 
(Ravndal and Bjørgo 2018: 6). When referencing far-right groups working within democratic 
frameworks, I will describe these elements as the “far-right,” in contrast with far-right groups 
or individuals that do not operate within democratic frameworks, which I will refer to as “far-
right extremists” or “far-right extremism.”  
2.2 Mainstream and Far-Right Political Parties   
As discussed in the introduction of this analysis, the mainstream refers to a composite 
of “competing views and diverse beliefs” that “benefit from social approval” at any given 
time (Picciotto 2002: 323). “To adopt mainstream attitudes is to ‘go with the flow’…To 
espouse mainstream views is to minimize the risk of confrontation and ostracism. To endorse 
mainstream policies and programs is to benefit from social approval” (322). Mainstreaming, a 
dynamic process, “requires…the exercise of compulsion and persuasion” and “innovation 
and adaptability combined with consistency of purpose and the ability to consolidate support 
for change” (Picciotto 2002: 325). Those individuals or groups who attempt to introduce their 
beliefs or priorities to the mainstream must therefore “strike an appropriate balance between 
conformity and diversity as well as between stability and change” (Picciotto 2002: 325). 
The difference between mainstream and far-right political parties was explored in 
2005 by Bonnie Meguid, who wrote a landmark paper on the interactions between 
mainstream political parties and “challenger” or “niche” political parties. Her work references 
Downs’ economic intervention-based spatial model of party competition (Downs 1957). In 
Downs’ model, parties change their stances in order to lure voters, and reposition themselves 
in the spatial model based on other parties’ movements (Mavrogordatos 1987). Meguid’s 
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paper builds on this theory by discussing the reaction of mainstream parties to the 
introduction of smaller niche parties, a category within which she includes the far-right 
(Meguid 2005). She defines “mainstream” parties as “electorally dominant actors in the 
center-left, center, and center-right blocs on the Left-Right political spectrum” as described 
by Downs, who refers to the “traditional class-based orientation of politics” based on 
economic intervention by the government (Meguid 2005: 347).  
By contrast, Meguid defines niche parties as parties who prioritize limited platforms 
and emphasize certain issues that “have previously been neglected by their already 
established competitors” (Meyer and Wagner 2013: 1248). Niche parties eschew the 
economic intervention-based Left-Right continuum of mainstream parties in favor of 
prioritizing “sets of issues which were previously outside the dimensions of party 
competition” and do not fall neatly along economic lines (Meguid 2005: 347). The niche 
party’s stance on their chosen issues are “not only novel [in terms of the issue raised] but they 
often do not coincide with existing lines of political division [and therefore] …appeal to 
groups of voters that may cross-cut traditional partisan alignments” (Meguid 2005: 348). 
Finally, niche parties do not attempt to provide “the comprehensive policy platforms common 
to their mainstream party peers,” instead relying on the perceived resonance of a set of 
chosen issues to garner voter support (Meguid 2005: 348).  
Meguid classifies the majority of far-right parties as niche parties which emphasize 
“the protection of (patriarchal) family values and a nationally oriented, immigrant-free way 
of life” (Meguid 2005: 348). Rather than compete on an economic intervention-driven 
platform, far-right parties prioritize a set of key issues—immigration, security, corruption and 
foreign policy—at the expense of the wide-ranging comprehensive platform of a mainstream 
party. To compete with mainstream parties as they grow in popularity, a far-right party may 
later adopt a wider policy platform. For example, “the anti-EU U.K. Independence Party 
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[attempted] to broaden its profile as a strategy to get rid of its ‘single-issue party’ image” 
(Meyer and Wagner 2013: 1249). Similarly, mainstream parties may identify a niche issue or 
set of issues popularized by the far-right and choose to compete on them or prioritize them 
above other issues to win votes in a political environment where those issues are becoming 
salient, such as the Austrian Freedom Party’s shift from liberal mainstream party to 
nationalist niche party (Meyer and Wagner 2013).  
In this study, I define mainstream political parties as electorally dominant actors 
championing a comprehensive platform of issues. Far right parties, by contrast, emphasize a 
set of niche issues that are deprioritized by mainstream parties and which correspond with the 
typical ideological markers of the far-right (nativism, nationalism, xenophobia, hierarchical 
exclusion, authoritarianism, and traditionalism) but do not adhere to Downs’ economic 
intervention-based political spectrum. An electorally dominant mainstream party 
championing a far-right issue within a comprehensive platform remains a mainstream party 
and similarly, a far-right party that broadens its platform to include a comprehensive range of 
issues while experiencing a surge of popular support may be considered to have become a 
mainstream party.    
The differences in the success of far-right parties and the transfer of far-right frames 
across countries can be argued to be due to a range of factors. Antonis Ellinas argues that 
mainstream parties co-opt or incorporate far-right frames in response to two factors:  
increased voter competition and political context and discursive opportunities that arise as a 
result of media coverage and public responses to internal or external events (Ellinas 2010). 
This theory is supported by Meguid’s description of niche parties and Downs’ and Hooghe et. 
al’s spatial models, which maintain that the parties reposition themselves in response to one 
another’s ideological stances. Ellinas argues that while traditional economic intervention-
based issues continue to drive the bulk of party competition in Western Europe, over “the 
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past few decades, they have been supplemented by a set of non-materialist issues that cut 
across traditional party cleavages” (Ellinas 2010: 67). These cultural issues (Ellinas describes 
them as “immigration, citizenship, asylum, and historical memory”) are the “niche” issues 
defined by Meguid and measured by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s GAL-TAN variable that 
cut across traditional economic intervention-oriented voting blocs (Ellinas 2010: 67). Both 
far-right and mainstream parties are responding to increased voter receptiveness to cultural 
issues by incorporating “national identity themes into their programs, creating a new axis of 
party competition” (Ellinas 2010: 67).    
The competitive relationship between far-right political parties and mainstream 
political parties is reinforcing: if mainstream parties incorporate far-right frames to compete 
for voters, the increased legitimacy afforded to the frames simultaneously heightens their 
potency in the political debate and increases the far-right’s likelihood of electoral success. 
The role of mainstream political parties in the mainstreaming of the far-right is further 
outlined by Mudde in his 2019 book, The Far-Right Today. Like Ellinas, he argues that the 
unique political context of each country, including voter competition and political structure, 
impacts the mainstreaming of far-right parties. However, there are four main strategies that 
mainstream parties take in response to the far-right, two of which are vehicles that encourage 
far-right frames to mainstream. Demarcation, the first strategy, is the exclusion of far-right 
political parties from politics through the use of the cordon sanitaire, first introduced as a 
strategy to prevent far-right parties from forming coalition governments (Mudde 2019: 135). 
Mainstream cordons “are starting to show cracks” and only hold until it “becomes expedient 
for a specific party to break the cordon” (134). Confrontation, the second strategy, defined as 
active opposition to far-right parties, “has become less and less common in the twenty-first 
century as populist and radical right parties have become more successful electorally and 
more relevant politically” (Mudde 2019: 136). 
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Both strategies can be observed in the response to the Sweden Democrats in Sweden 
and the National Rally (formerly National Front) in France. Both parties won significant 
electoral margins for the first time in the 2000s, as National Front figurehead Jean-Marie Le 
Pen “shocked the world by…qualifying for the second round of the presidential election” in 
2002 and the Sweden Democrats won parliamentary representation in 2010 (Nathanson 2020: 
1). In both cases, the parties were widely criticized by the media and swiftly siloed by 
mainstream political parties. Le Pen was stymied by a ‘“republican front” formed by both the 
left and right in an attempt to stop him in his tracks’” and Sweden’s five leading political 
parties joined forces in a statement that they would not negotiate with or seek parliamentary 
backing from the Sweden Democrats (Nathanson 2020: 1). It is notable that neither strategy 
appears to have been effective. The National Rally and the Sweden Democrats have since 
both moved to downplay their extremist past and as a result have “become more successful 
electorally and more relevant politically” (Mudde 2019: 136). In recent years, their electoral 
victories have not garnered equivalent levels of public outrage, which prevents mainstream 
parties from taking hardline stances.  
The third and fourth strategies described by Mudde deal more directly with the 
mainstreaming of far-right frames. The third strategy, cooptation, involves the exclusion of 
far-right parties but not far-right frames. Excluding far-right parties but not their ideas is a 
difficult project, particularly if discursive opportunities such as visibility are increasing voter 
receptiveness to cultural issues, like the idea that migration is a threat to cultural identity, that 
are prioritized by the far-right. Ellinas describes how mainstream parties dipped a toe in 
“national identity issues,” a typical far-right niche (Ellinas 2010: 140). Recognizing the 
political salience of national and cultural identity in the wake of globalization, mainstream 
parties hoped to take advantage of an issue that cut across traditional voter blocs but this 
strategy made them politically vulnerable to far-right parties that prioritized these issues. 
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Across Europe, far-right frames around migration began to enter the political mainstream in 
response to larger waves of immigration. Under political pressure, “liberal democratic parties 
primarily adopted populist right-wing radical discourse, problematizing…immigration and 
multiculturalism without substantially changing their policies” (Mudde 2019: 136). The final 
strategy described by Mudde, incorporation, is the mainstreaming and normalizing of far-
right parties themselves, which can be observed in diminishing objections to the presence of 
far-right parties in mainstream politics (Mudde 2019). In many cases incorporation occurs as 
a result of large far-right voting margins that force mainstream parties to engage with far-
right parties, often as a result of the success of the far-right party’s suppression of its 
extremist roots.  
2.3 The Mainstreaming of Far-Right Frames by Political Parties   
Aristotle Kallas argues that the growing appeal of far-right frames in Europe “owes at 
least as much to the weakening defenses or cynical opportunism of the mainstream as to the 
dynamics and appeal of the radical right’s ideas themselves” (Kallas 2013: 221). Two factors 
are at play here. First, far-right parties are at once downplaying their links to extremism and 
taking advantage of the growing salience of cultural issues in the modern political ecosystem 
(Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002). Second, by “embracing and reproducing (however 
strategically or opportunistically in many cases) aspects of the far right’s hyper-nationalist 
and xenophobic discourses” mainstream political parties are giving “indirect legitimacy to 
taboo ideas of extremist provenance, and effectively become agents of their mainstreaming” 
(Kallas 2013: 225). Kallas describes how both mainstream political parties and far-right 
political parties simultaneously encourage the mainstreaming of far-right frames, saying:  
  “at a time when far-right parties strategically calibrate their discourses to cater to 
shifting social demand and tone down accusations of extremism without usually 
changing the radical nature of their aggressive anti-immigration message, political 
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mainstream constituencies have often shown an alarming tendency to grant legitimacy 
to such views, either by working with far-right parties in government or by 
appropriating some of their radical discourses. Either way, the far right has exercised 
a disproportionate effect on the shaping of the political agenda on key contemporary 
issues such as immigration, Islam, national identity, and national security” (Kallas 
2013:  228). 
Kallas’ argument is underscored by Ellinas, who argues that the response of mainstream 
political parties to far-right frames (whether co-optation or incorporation) is due to both 
increased political competition by the far-right and the existence of discursive opportunities 
that encourage far-right frames to enter the mainstream (Ellinas 2010). 
Together, these trends—the political competitiveness of the far-right and the response 
of mainstream political parties to their success—flourish in an atmosphere of instability that 
both creates opportunities for far-right frames to cross into the mainstream and encourages 
public demand for these frames. Essentially, an increased receptiveness to far-right frames 
must coexist with their growing visibility in the public debate and a ripe political context. 
Kallas believes that a combination of “long-term trends (stereotypes and prejudices, lack of 
intimacy with ‘the other’)” and “short-term factors (such as periods of sustained difficulty or 
aggravation, including the debilitating effects of economic crisis and of rapidly increasing 
migration flows)” create moments of instability where the public becomes unusually 
receptive to far-right frames (Kallas 2013: 225). In such moments, far-right frames can 
“cross” the border of what is acceptable for discussion in a public forum, entering the 
mainstream.  
Koopmans and Olzak elaborate on the mechanism that allows an issue, ideology or 
frame to rise to the top of the hundreds of issues and ideologies simultaneously competing for 
attention and acceptance in the mainstream debate (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 202). They 
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define this phenomenon as “discursive opportunities,” or “the aspects of the public discourse 
that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere” (Koopmans and Olzak 
2004: 202). Koopmans and Olzak’s theory of discursive opportunities bridges the gap 
between two existing theoretical bodies of literature on social movements: political context, 
which are the various “opportunities and constraints” of a political ecosystem at a given time, 
and framing theory, which describes how stakeholders interpret and frame events to 
intentionally influence and shape popular opinion (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 201). 
Koopmans and Olzak argue that framing theory, while effective at describing how actors 
create meaning around events to mobilize followers, falls short in explaining why some 
frames are more effective at motivating voters (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Discursive 
opportunities, in addition to political context, may explain why certain frames are able to 
enter the mainstream more effectively than others. This study examines both political context 
and the discursive opportunity of the increase in migration to determine whether far-right 
frames were incorporated by center and center-right parties differently in Sweden and France.  
According to Koopmans and Olzak’s theory on discursive opportunities, the public 
discourse, or the top issues being debated by media outlets, politicians and the general public, 
has a “finite carrying capacity at any point in time” (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 203). Three 
discursive opportunities—visibility, resonance, and legitimacy—determine which frames are 
prioritized, or get to enter the mainstream. First, visibility, or the “number of communicative 
channels by which a message is included and the prominence of such inclusion” is 
determined (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 203). The second factor is resonance, or the ability 
of a message to provoke a reaction, both positive or negative, from the gate keepers and the 
general public (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 204). The third factor, legitimacy, is “the degree 
to which, on average, reactions by third actors in the public sphere support an actor’s claims 
more than they reject them” (Koopmans and Olzak 2004: 205). All three variables are vital to 
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determining how far and wide a frame is diffused in the public sphere, attaining mainstream 
status if given the opportunity. In this thesis, the first of the three factors, visibility, will be 
considered, specifically the visibility of the increase in migration in France and Sweden.   
2.4 Research Gap  
The majority of existing research on the mechanisms by which far-right frames enter 
the mainstream refers to social movement theory (Benford & Snow 1992, Benford & Snow 
2000). In their overview of framing processes and social movements, Benford and Snow 
describe framing as the active work of agents involved in social movements to assign 
significance or greater meaning to “structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing 
ideologies” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614).  Framing theory has also been applied to 
understand the influence of media on political opinion. Media outlets use framing techniques 
to help audiences interpret events (Scheufele 1999). “The framing and presentation of events 
and news in the mass media can thus systematically affect how recipients of the news come 
to understand those events” (Scheufele 1999: 107). While framing theory is primarily applied 
to disciplines other than political science, in 2018 Elgenius and Rydgren noted the 
importance of applying framing theory to the study of political parties. They argued that 
political parties use frames to manipulate public opinion by presenting “a simplified image or 
representation of what a particular party represents” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 585). Even 
“condensed into a few words or slogans,” political party frames can “influence how voters 
understand and interpret the world” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 585). Political parties, 
politicians, and media outlets all use frames to shape public opinion. 
This thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on framing by political parties by 
expanding on Elgenius and Rydgren’s 2018 article, which argued that far-right parties in 
Sweden used five anti-migrant frames to draw voters to the polls. The article specifically 
focused on the use of anti-migrant frames by the Sweden Democrats to analyze both how far-
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right parties frame their message over time and whether or not modernization resulted in a 
decreased salience of anti-migrant frames (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018) The article found that 
anti-migrant frames remained central to the message of the Sweden Democrats over time, 
arguing that “the success of recent elections is a matter of successful framing and the ability 
to identify and synchronize the perceived social problems in question, blaming those 
responsible, and providing solutions” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 597). The five anti-
migrant frames studied by Elgenius and Rydgren have been weaponized by far-right parties 
across Europe, in part because immigration is purportedly “the single most important reason 
as to why voters support the radical right” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 584). The frames 
analyzed by Elgenius and Rydgren are as follows: 
1. Migrants compete illegitimately for scarce resources such as jobs and housing.  
2. Migrants reduce the level of welfare state benefits available to native citizens.   
3. Migrants are a threat to the ethnonational identity of the country.  
4. Migrants, particularly Islamic migrants, threaten the liberal values of the country.  
5. Migrants are the main perpetrators of crime and as such are creating a security 
threat. 
This thesis expands on Elgenius and Rydgren’s 2018 article by first, documenting 
how and when three of the five far-right anti-migrant frames entered the political party 
manifestos of center and center-right parties in Sweden and France. The three frames under 
study in this thesis are 2, 3, and 5 (migrants commit crimes, migrants reduce welfare benefits, 
and migrants are a threat to the ethnonational identity of the country). These frames are 
chosen because the other two (jobs and housing and Islam as a threat to liberal values) do not 
offer a similar enough context in each country. For example, the jobs and housing frame 
refers to different social situations because unemployment rates and housing scarcity differ 
between Sweden and France during the time period studied. Additionally, the fourth frame, 
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the impact of Islamic migrants on liberal values, is likely to differ in France compared to 
Sweden as a result of France’s historical background of colonialism in countries where Islam 
is a major religion. 
The first of the five frames studied, the idea that an increased number of migrants 
leads to greater levels of crime, “depicts immigrants as a major cause of criminality and other 
kinds of social insecurity” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 584). Far-right frames around this 
issue attribute any increase in crime or gang activity to increased migration rates and suggests 
limiting migration enforcing the removal of migrants who commit crimes. The migrant crime 
frame can also refer to terrorism, but in this thesis, frames referring to terrorism will be 
downplayed to reduce the difference in the rate of terror attacks on voter response to far-right 
frames in Sweden and France during the time period studied.  
The second frame, welfare chauvinism, pits “the supposed costs of immigration 
against welfare state benefits that could have been used by the native citizens (i.e. welfare 
chauvinism)” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 584). These far-right frames encourage native 
citizens of the country to believe that accepting more migrants translates into less available 
welfare funding or less access to limited resources. Therefore, argues the far-right, native 
citizens should be prioritized and access to resources and welfare should be limited or denied 
to migrants. The third frame, cultural unity, argues that migrants are culturally incompatible 
with the native population and that this cultural incompatibility is driving tension and 
instability in the state. Far-right frames around national cultural identity “depict immigration 
as a threat to the ethno-national identity of the majority” (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 584). 
The far-right waxes nostalgic about the prior existence of a golden period of Western 
European Christian cultural heritage (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018: 593). Rather than pursue 
multicultural immigration policies, the far-right argues that the state should pursue 
assimilation, limit the number of migrants, and actively promote cultural programs 
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underscoring a Christian and Western European national cultural identity. While research has 
examined the process by which frames are mainstreamed, and the importance of the use of 
frames by political parties, few studies have documented when and how frames championed 
by far-right parties enter the platforms of mainstream political parties. Even fewer have 
focused on the role of discursive opportunities and political context on the differences in how 
far-right frames are mainstreamed between countries. This thesis examines first, when the 
three far-right anti-migrant frames described above were incorporated by center and center-
right political parties between 2007 and 2018, and second, the extent to which the visibility of 
the increase in migration as a discursive opportunity and the current political environment of 


















CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Framing theory sheds light on how actors actively shape popular opinion surrounding 
events. It can be used to understand how far-right actors, in this case political parties, frame 
events to influence popular opinion and voter behavior. As Koopmans and Olzak 
demonstrate, framing allows far-right actors to mold public opinion while discursive 
opportunities can determine which frames enter the mainstream. Discursive opportunities 
provide an opening for far-right frames to achieve visibility and thereby enter the 
mainstream. This phenomenon can be observed in the emergence of far-right frames in center 
and center-right political party platforms.  
Frames “define problems,” “diagnose causes,” “make moral judgements,” and “assign 
remedies” (Entman 1993: 52). They highlight certain events or aspects of an event as more or 
less important. They assign blame. They can omit facts, if useful to the framer. They boil 
problems down to simplistic, easy to understand concepts. Frames select certain events or 
“aspects of reality” and make them salient or important to the public discourse (Entman 1993: 
52). In a political context, studying frames is more useful than studying ideologies because 
frames are less stable—voters can easily pick them up—and therefore can be applied more 
easily and strategically by far-right parties (Elgenius and Rydgren 2018). 
Parties attempt to frame issues so that they might achieve the three discursive 
opportunities required to enter the mainstream—visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Frames 
can be diagnostic (defining a problem), motivational (garnering support for action), or 
prognostic (identifying a preferred solution) (Benford and Snow 2000). Frames resonate with 
the public and help individuals to assign meaning and interpretation to the world around them 
“by simplifying and condensing” complicated events (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). They 
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are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings” that “inspire and legitimate the activities” 
of “political parties, policymakers, or social movement agents” and influence the behavior of 
the public, by garnering support and adherents (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). They drive 
people to attend protests, show up to elections, and even commit crimes. Simply put, they 
define “what is going on” or “should be going on” and why (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). 
Frames around cultural unity that promote national “myths about a shared history and cultural 
homogeneity” is an example of one frame employed frequently by the far-right (Elgenius and 
Rydgren 2018: 584). 
One famous example of framing in a political context was U.S. President George W. 
Bush’s response to the 9/11 terror attacks. “Bush defined a problem in simple and emotional 
terms as an “act of war” and identified its clear cause as an “enemy” that was “evil.” (Entman 
2003: 415). He intentionally used the same frames over and over, using “evil fully five times 
and war twelve times in his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002” (Entman 2003: 
416). According to Entman, “repeating these terms was part of the Bush administration’s 
strategy of framing September 11 to ‘unite’ the country behind” his preferred solution, “a war 
against terrorism” (Entman 2003: 416). He hoped to influence public opinion in support of 
his solution by conveying “an unambiguous and emotionally compelling frame to the public” 
(Entman 2003: 416). As a result, he received “virtually unanimous assent from Congress and 
the media” (416). Media outlets and other politicians summarily took the cue—echoing his 
frame—to “overwhelming public approval” (Entman 2003: 416). In this case, Bush’s framing 
identified foreign governments harboring terrorists as the problem and war as the preferred 
solution. 
Analyzing far-right frames as they enter center and center-right party platforms 
exposes the mechanisms by which far-right ideology becomes mainstreamed. Framing allows 
far-right parties to define the environment around them in a way that maximizes their chances 
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of mobilizing potential voters. Discursive opportunities, such as visibility of a certain issue, 
determine which frames enter the political mainstream. Documenting the transfer of far-right 
frames creates an opportunity to analyze the discursive and political environments in which 
far-right frames have flourished and to understand why far-right frames are incorporated 
differently in different countries. If used effectively, framing can not only enable far-right 
frames to enter the mainstream in a single country. Far-right frames can be applied at a global 
level, encouraging the movement and transference of far-right ideology between countries, a 
fact which underscores the importance of studying this phenomenon.   
3.1 Hypotheses  
This thesis first documents how three far-right anti-immigrant frames were adopted 
by mainstream center and center-right parties in France and Sweden between 2007 and 2018. 
Next, it analyzes how two independent variables—the increasing visibility of the increase in 
migration as a discursive opportunity and the political context, including vote margins and 
differences in political system—may have impacted the transfer of these frames differently in 
each country. Framing theory suggests that far-right frames would transfer more effectively 
between far-right and center and center-right parties in countries where discursive 
opportunities arising as a result of the increase in migration influenced voters and in countries 
where the far-right was more politically competitive. In these contexts, center and center-
right parties would respond to the changing political and discursive environment by 
incorporating far-right frames into their manifestos.  
Based on previous research by Bayerlein (2021), Downs (1957), Rydgren (2008), 
Magni-Berton and Panel (2017), Meguid (2005) and Mudde (2007), it is clear that parties 
interact with one another and change their position in the spatial model based on both the 
behavior of other parties and the current political context and discursive environment. As 
argued by Ellinas, frames transfer between far-right and mainstream parties as a result of both 
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discursive opportunities created by the media and political structures and “party positioning 
in the competitive space” that encourage mainstream parties to compete for voters by 
adopting far-right frames (Ellinas 2010: 3). Mainstream parties will pursue Mudde’s strategy 
of cooptation, incorporating far-right frames in their political manifestos, if they believe that 
it is to their political benefit to do so. Specifically, if the far-right is competitive in the 
previous election, it is likely that center and center-right parties will incorporate far-right 
frames in the subsequent election manifesto. Additionally, the existence of discursive 
opportunities, in this case increased visibility of the increase in migration, should increase the 
likelihood that far-right frames will enter the manifestos of mainstream parties.  
Given these arguments, I hypothesize the following:  
H1: Increased visibility of the so-called “migration crisis” led to increased mainstream 
adoption of far-right frames by center and center-right parties.  
H2: Increased political competition by the far-right increased the mainstream adoption of far-
right frames by center and center-right parties. 
Previous research by Ellinas states that anti-migrant frames promoted by far-right 
political parties should transfer to the manifestos of center and center-right political parties in 
France and Sweden during the time period analyzed (Ellinas 2010). This transfer should be 
impacted both by discursive opportunities arising from the increase in migration, specifically 
increased visibility of migration, in addition to the political context, specifically an increase 
in voter competition by the far-right and the unique political structure of each country. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD AND MATERIAL 
In this section, I describe the method and materials used for this analysis. This thesis 
seeks to understand how discursive opportunities and political context impacted when and 
how far-right frames entered the mainstream. To do this, I first use frame analysis to 
document the point at which far-right frames crossed over to materials published by center 
and center-right parties. Second, I analyze how a single discursive opportunity, visibility of 
the increase in migration, and the unique political context of each country encouraged far-
right frames to transfer.  
4.1 Method: Frame Analysis  
Previous research has considered the reactions of mainstream parties to far-right 
parties (Ellinas 2010; Meguid 2005; Mudde 2000; 2007; 2019) and the use of frames by 
political parties (Elgenius & Rydgren 2018). However, few scholars have documented the 
transfer of far-right frames to the political manifestos of center and center-right parties or 
analyzed external factors (such as discursive opportunities and political competition) that 
impact their transfer. In this thesis, I consider when and how frames transferred from far-right 
to center and center-right political parties, and the discursive opportunities and political 
contexts that impact their transfer. This study examines the political manifestos of 
mainstream and far-right political parties in France and Sweden, using the qualitative method 
of frame analysis to document when three far-right anti-migrant frames appeared in the 
manifestos of center and center-right political parties and supplementary data to analyze the 
impact of visibility of the increase in migration and the political context of each country. 
Frame analysis is “a thematic analysis that classifies and quantifies the contents of media 
artifacts and political documents” (Ruzza 2006: 607). To conduct frame analysis, far-right 
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frames in the text materials, political manifestos, are identified and their prevalence across 
the material under study is assessed (Connolly-Ahern and Broadway 2008; Entman 2007).  
I conduct my analysis in two parts. First, I examine whether three of Elgenius and 
Rydgren’s far-right frames appear in the manifestos of far-right political parties in both 
France and Sweden between 2007 and 2018. I identify the common phrasing, language, and 
tone used by the far-right for the three frames in both countries in Figure 1. Next, I 
determined the point at which these frames appear in the political manifestos of center and 
center-right parties. Essentially, after identifying the common language used by the far right 
in both countries for all three frames, I assess if similar language exists in the political 
manifestos of center and center-right parties. After searching for the frames identified in the 
platforms of the far-right parties in both Sweden and France, I next analyze the political 
manifestos of the three largest mainstream parties in each country to document when each 
frame appears. For the second part of my analysis, I assess supplementary data on migration 
rates, vote margins, and GAL-TAN scores to test my two hypotheses and examine the ways 
in which discursive opportunities (visibility of the increase in migration), and the political 
context of each country enabled far-right frames to resonate in the mainstream.  
4.2 Material  
The materials for the first part of the analysis, frame documentation, are found in the 
Manifesto Project Database, which collates the official election manifestos of “1000 parties 
from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents” (Burst et al. 2021). The 
Manifesto Project is funded by the German Science Foundation and the dataset is updated 
twice a year. In this analysis, I use official party manifestos from three large political parties 
in Sweden and France between 2007 and 2018 (one far-right party, a center party, and a 
center-right party). The largest center-right and center parties in Sweden are the Moderata 
Samlingspartiet (the Moderate Party), and the Centerpartiet (the Center Party), and the 
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largest far-right party is the Sweden Democrats. I analyze political manifestos published by 
all three parties in 2010, 2014, and 2018. The two largest center-right and center parties in 
France are the Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)/Les Républicains (The Union 
for a Popular Movement (UMP)/The Republicans) and La République En Marche! (LREM) 
(The Republic on the Move (LREM), or En Marche!) which was founded in 2016 by 
Emmanuel Macron. The largest far-right party is the National Rally, which was renamed 
from the National Front in 2018. I analyze election manifestos published by UMP/The 
Républicains and the National Front in 2007 and 2012, and election manifestos published by 
all three parties in 2017.  
Admittedly, analyzing only official party literature is a limited analysis. Far-right 
frames appear in the mainstream across several different types of publications, including 
position papers, line speeches, and the social media posts of politicians and party figures. 
Official party manifestos are less likely to take a controversial position in comparison with 
off the cuff remarks or less polished literature sources. Additionally, all forms of print, 
televised and social media play a role in the mainstreaming process by creating discursive 
opportunities for far-right frames to gain visibility, resonance and legitimacy, increasing the 
likelihood that these frames will be picked up by mainstream politicians and mainstream 
media outlets.8 A comprehensive approach would include media sources and additional 
political party statements and speeches, but due to limited time and resources, these materials 
are beyond the scope of this analysis. All of the manifestos were published in Swedish and 
 
8 As parties move and shift in response to an increase in voter receptiveness to far-right frames, media attention 
can impact both the ability of far-right parties to publicize their frames and the likelihood that mainstream 
parties will mimic or incorporate frames. The literature overwhelmingly supports the finding that media 
attention is essential to the mainstreaming of far-right frames (Ellinas 2010, Feischmidt and Hervik 2015, 
Kitschelt 1997, Gattinara and Froio 2019, Mudde 2007, Norris 2009, Schroeder 2019). 
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French. I used Google Translate and my French language skills to translate the manifestos 
and had all Swedish translations reviewed by a native Swedish speaker.9 
The materials for the second section of the analysis, the examination of the two 
hypotheses, come from several sources. First, the data used to assess visibility of the increase 
in migration as a discursive opportunity comes from Eurostat (Eurostat 2021). The data on 
voting margins comes from the national government websites of France and Sweden, 
Valmyndigheten (Sweden) and the website of the Ministère de L'Intérieur (France).10 The 
GAL-TAN scores are found in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, conducted in 2006, 2010, 
2014, and 2017.11 All data is publicly available and easily replicable.  
4.3 Operationalization 
This thesis answers two questions surrounding the mainstreaming of far-right anti-
migrant frames from far-right parties to center and center-right parties. First, it documents 
when far-right anti-migrant frames transferred to the political manifestos of center and center-
right parties in Sweden and France between 2007-2018. Second, it examines two independent 
variables: the discursive opportunities created by the increase in migration, specifically 
visibility, and the political context of each country—to assess how either may have impacted 
the dependent variable, the transfer of anti-migrant frames. In the second part of the analysis, 
I determine the validity of my two hypotheses (H1: discursive opportunities, specifically 
visibility, led to the transfer of far-right frames and H2: increased political competition by 
far-right parties and the political structure of each country led to the transfer of far-right 
 
9 The native Swedish speaker in this case was a fellow classmate in the University of Gothenburg MA program, 
Julia Strandquist.  
 
 
10 Sources: Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2002; Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2007; Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 
2012; Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2017; Valmyndigheten 2006; Valmyndigheten 2010; Valmyndigheten 2014; 
and Valmyndigheten 2018.  
 
 
11 Sources: Bakker et. al 2015; Polk et al. 2014; and Polk et. al 2017.  
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frames). Using frame analysis, I first examine the manifestos of the far-right parties in 
Sweden and France between 2007 and 2018, documenting when three of the five far-right 
anti-migrant frames highlighted by Elgenius and Rydgren (migrants commit crimes, migrants 
reduce the availability of welfare, migrants are a cultural threat) transfer to the political 
manifestos of center and center-right parties and therefore enter the political mainstream 
(Elgenius and Rydgren 2018). I conducted frame analysis to assess the specific language, 
phrasing and tone of each frame when it first appeared in the political party manifestos of far-
right parties in Sweden and France between 2007 and 2018. Sweden’s manifestos were 
published in 2010, 2014, and 2018. France’s manifestos were published in 2007, 2012, and 
2017. Next, I created a table (below) documenting the frames I created, ie: the general 
language, tone and phrasing of the frames as they appeared in the far-right political party 
manifestos during those years in both countries. Finally, I documented the point at which the 
frames found in the far-right manifestos appeared in the manifestos of center and center-right 
parties using the codes I created from examining the far-right frames. Figure 1 describes the 
language, tone and phrasing of the three far-right frames as I found them in the far-right 
political party manifestos of Sweden and France between 2007-2018. 
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Next, I used the above codes to document when each frame appeared in political 
manifestos published by the center and center-right parties during election years between 
2007 and 2018.  For example, I recorded the point at which a far-right frame appeared in a 
far-right manifesto during the period of study, then when that frame appeared in a manifesto 
published by the center or center-right party. Finally, I developed a set of tables (found in the 
analysis) illustrating the year at which each far-right frame appeared in the manifestos of the 
center and center-right parties and far-right party in each country. In conducting this analysis, 
Figure 1: Coding of Anti-Migrant Far-Right Frames in 2007-2018 Far-Right Party Manifestos  
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I hoped to answer the first research question of the thesis: how and when did center and 
center-right parties in France and Sweden incorporate anti-migrant frames originally found in 
the platforms of far-right parties? 
Finally, I answer the second research question, whether the visibility of the increase in 
migration, and the political context of each country (increased vote competition by the far-
right and political structures) impacted the transfer of far-right frames. To do this, I examine 
publicly available supplementary data in a set of tables to test my hypotheses. In this thesis, I 
assess Koopmans and Olzak’s (2004) first discursive opportunity, visibility, in terms of the 
migrant crisis, by analyzing how many immigrants entered France and Sweden during the 
time period and at what rate. By comparing the yearly change in immigrants, the yearly 
percentage change, and the ratio of immigrants to population between both countries, I assess 
the visibility of the increase in migration as a discursive opportunity in order to analyze its 
potential impact on frame transfer. Second, I analyze the unique political context of each 
country by comparing the vote margins for each party prior to the publication of each 
manifesto. For example, I examine the 2007 vote margins in France to determine whether 
increased political competition by the far-right may have impacted the incorporation of far-
right frames in the 2012 manifestos of center and center-right parties. I also discuss the 
potential impact of differences in France and Sweden’s political system on the transfer of 
frames based on previous literature. Finally, I also assess the GAL-TAN scores published by 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of the center-right, center, and far-right parties in each country 
prior to each election to understand how the parties changed position in the spatial model in 
relation to one another in response to increased voter competition. In doing so, I hope to draw 
conclusions about the impact of political context, particularly voter competition, on the 




4.4 Validity and Reliability  
In terms of the frame analysis, by creating a table that clearly describes the far-right 
frame codes I created by examining the political manifestos of far-right parties between 2007 
and 2018, I believe that intersubjectivity is achieved and that a second researcher will be able 
to apply the same codes and replicate my analysis. It is important to acknowledge that my 
personal background and bias may have impacted the creation of these codes, but because 
they are clearly stated in Figures 1 and 2, I hope that a second researcher will be able to 
interpret the codes I created and determine the point at which they appear in the political 
manifestos of center and center-right parties in France and Sweden during the time period. 
Admittedly, if I had used a standard set of codes, or the researcher were to create their own 
codes for the far-right frames, intersubjectivity would decrease. However, no pre-existing set 
of qualitative codes for far-right frames in France and Sweden existed. I created the codes 
and coded the material during a specific time period to minimize the likelihood of achieving 
different results depending on personal circumstance. The second part of my analysis, which 
examines supplementary data, achieves the benchmarks of validity and reliability because I 
clearly describe how to locate the data in the tables and describe the method of my analysis. 
All of the supplementary data used in this thesis is publicly available.     
 The analysis achieves validity because the method and materials are suitable to the 
research questions and hypotheses presented in the text. The limitations of using political 
party manifestos to analyze frame transfer and the mainstreaming of far-right frames is 
discussed above. Similarly, in the second part of the analysis, this thesis only considers 
visibility rather than resonance or legitimacy as a discursive opportunity impacting the 
transfer of frames. Visibility was chosen as an independent variable because resonance and 
legitimacy are more difficult to measure with validity. Visibility of the increase in migration 
is analyzed in this thesis by comparing the yearly change in immigrants, the yearly 
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percentage change, and the ratio of immigrants to population between both countries. Not 
only was this data easily found and publicly available, there is no need to consider the 
phrasing of the survey question and the data is available across the entire time period. 
Analyzing resonance (the extent to which the public reacts to a message) and legitimacy (or 
public support for a message) is more complex. Resonance may be measured through public 
opinion data on immigration, which is not available during each year of the time period 
studied, and is difficult to compare because the data is dependent on the phrasing of the 
survey question.  
Additionally, the historical background of each country (legacy of colonialism etc.) 
impacts the resonance of the migration issue in each country and this thesis does not have 
room to consider historical background. Legitimacy is difficult to analyze because of its 
circular logic in the context of mainstreaming. If center and center-right political parties 
incorporate far-right frames in their manifestos, it is likely that these frames have legitimacy 
(ie: have public support). However, given that the incorporation of frames is the dependent 
variable under study, it is difficult to assess legitimacy in this context. Therefore, visibility is 
the most straightforward of the three discursive opportunities to analyze as an independent 
variable. Analyzing voting margins and GAL-TAN scores to understand how political 
context impacted the transfer of frames is reliable and valid because of the public nature of 
this data and the extensive use of these variables in previous literature around political 







CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 
This analysis consists of two sections. First, I document when the three anti-migrant 
far-right frames appear in the political manifestos of far-right and mainstream parties in 
Sweden and France. Second, I examine the visibility of migration as a discursive opportunity 
by discussing the yearly change in immigrants, the yearly percentage change, and the ratio of 
immigrants to population in both countries. Finally, I examine the vote margins for each 
political party in the election prior to the publication of the previously examined political 
manifesto and the GAL-TAN scores of the political parties under observation in 
corresponding years. In examining these variables, I hope to conclude how political context 
and discursive opportunities, such as visibility, influenced the mainstreaming of far-right 
frames.  
5.1 The Mainstreaming of Anti-Migrant Frames in France and Sweden  
In this section, I document when three anti-migrant far-right frames appeared in the 
political party manifestos of far-right, center, and center-right parties in Sweden and France. 
First, I examine at what point each far-right frame appears in the political party manifesto of 
the far-right party in each country, and next, document the point at which the center and 
center-right political parties in each country incorporate the frames.  
5.1.1 Frame 1: “Migrants commit crimes”  
In France, the National Front (FN) directly references immigrants in the party’s 2007 
manifesto, stating that “foreigners commit more crimes and misdemeanors than French 
citizens: one in five crimes, even though they represent only 6% of the population" (National 
Front Manifesto 2007). According to the party, “criminality in our country is primarily aimed 
at people and it is mainly the result of immigration” and “four French regions concentrate 
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more than half of the criminal acts…[and] account for the majority of immigration” (National 
Front Manifesto 2007). The party argued that the media depicts migrants committing crimes 
as “young” to downplay the gravity of their actions and that “policies implemented to restore 
calm have [failed]…by refusing to recognize that the perpetrators of violence are 
predominantly immigrants” (National Front Manifesto 2007). The party determined that 
migrants should be stripped of their citizenship if they commit a crime and deported, “either 
at the end of their sentence, or preferably within the framework of bilateral transfer 
agreements allowing the effective execution of their sentence in their country of origin" 
(National Front Manifesto 2007). In 2012, the National Front echoed its frames on crime but 
mentioned migrants less explicitly, only maintaining that prison sentences against migrants 
should be executed in the country of origin. In 2017, the party expanded on earlier policies: 
“the State [should] take back control of lawless areas…introduce, in addition to the criminal 
penalty, the civil removal order” and “reinstate the automatic deportation of criminals and 
foreign offenders” (National Front Manifesto 2017). There are also several references to 
jihadist terror.   
In 2007, The Union for a Popular Movement/The Republicans (UMP) directly 
referenced the migrant crime frame, particularly in talking about “the suburbs,” a common 
far-right claim regarding the low-income banlieues12 that has been echoed by far-right media 
globally (UMP Manifesto 2007). “Despite the significant public funds invested over the years 
in these neighborhoods, many feel abandoned by the Republic and violated in their dignity by 
the violence they endure on a daily basis and the living conditions that are theirs" (UMP 
Manifesto 2007)."Let us stop pretending that it is the excess of unemployment and the 
insufficiency of public funds which explain the situation of the suburbs...immigration [is] not 
 
12 Banlieue is the term commonly used for low-income housing projects in France, particularly on the outskirts 
of Paris. Many of these neighborhoods are have large first or second-generation migrant populations and the 
term evokes cultural stigma (Angélil & Siress 2012).  
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controlled, [nor] religious fundamentalism" (UMP Manifesto 2007). "For a long time in our 
country, and still today among our opponents, we have sought excuses for delinquency…we 
ignored…the consequences of uncontrolled immigration, the reality of discrimination. We 
have allowed to build amalgams between insecurity and suburbs, between delinquency and 
immigration, between violence and Islam. We led the French to fold in on themselves" (UMP 
Manifesto 2007).  The solution presented was to "prohibit any foreigner returned to their 
country of origin from obtaining a visa or a new residence permit in France within the next 
five years" (UMP Manifesto 2007).  
 In 2012, the UMP stated that additional expenditures “will focus on the execution of 
sentences, with the opening of new prison places…and the rigorous management of 
immigration with an increase in the capacities of administrative detention centers" (UMP 
Manifesto 2012). In 2017, UMP (now Les Républicains) focused more explicitly on 
terrorism, stating “we will prohibit the return of bi-nationals who have traveled abroad to 
areas of terrorist operations and jihadists. We will automatically expel foreigners with links to 
terrorist movements" (Les Républicains Manifesto 2017). “We will strengthen the resources 
and coordination of intelligence services interior, as well as European cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism” (Les Républicains Manifesto 2017). In 2017, the center party, the Republic 
on the Move (LREM), or En Marche  also discussed terrorism, stating that that “our 
international security will be part of a strategy of peacekeeping and the fight against Islamist 
terrorism. Internal security will require significant investment in our security forces, their 
reorganization, but also in the vigilance that our entire Nation must regain” (LREM 
Manifesto 2017). "Fear is now what we can experience at the time of us go to a station, to the 
terrace of a coffee, at a gathering that could to be a target for terrorists” (LREM Manifesto 
2017). The focus shifted from the National Front’s emphasis on the banlieues in 2007 to 
terrorism, arguably as a result of the 2015 and 2016 major terror attacks in France. To 
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conclude, I document that the migrant crime frame transferred to the center-right party 
manifestos in France in 2007 and 2012, but not in 2017. The frame does not transfer to the 
manifesto of the center party in 2017, with the exception of a focus on terrorism.  
Migrant crime was referred in the Sweden Democrat manifestos throughout the period 
2010-2018. While the party did not specifically reference migrants as the primary group 
committing crimes until 2018, compulsory deportation and citizenship revocation as a 
response to crime were mentioned in 2010. “The introduction of compulsory deportation for 
all foreign nationals who commit serious crimes" (Swedish Democrats Manifesto 2010). 
“People with dual citizenship who violate this ban must be able to have their Swedish 
citizenship revoked" (Swedish Democrats Manifesto 2014). In this way, migration was tied to 
crime in all of the manifestos published throughout the period. The Sweden Democrats 
framed crime as the result of high migration rates as early as 2010, but strengthened this 
framing by 2018. The solutions presented were compulsory deportation and citizenship 
revocation for foreign nationals who committed crimes, a direct reference to migrants as the 
culprits behind a rise of criminal activity in the country. Compulsory deportation was 
referenced as early as 2010, with citizenship revocation included by 2014.  
By 2018 the language was unambiguous about implicating migrants as a security 
threat, and included both compulsory deportation and citizenship revocation as solutions. 
“Fire brigades and ambulances cannot pull out into immigrant-dominated areas without 
armed escorts. Those who live and work in our suburbs have their shops robbed, smashed or 
taken over by criminals.” (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 2018). “Today, tens of thousands of 
people live illegally within the country's borders and Sweden is internationally known for 
unrest and citizens who are active in terrorist networks” (2018). “Security has been 
jeopardized because requirements and controls have been very weak, both in terms of stay in 
the country or granting citizenship” (2018). “As a result of uncontrolled immigration, 
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terrorists with war experience roam the streets and squares freely and take advantage of our 
welfare and asylum system” (2018) These phrases directly reference migrants in relation to 
perceived increases in crime. The solution proposed is to “introduce compulsory deportation 
of serious criminal aliens and the possibility of revoking citizenship in the event of a terrorist 
crime” (2018). By 2018, migrants were referred to as “terrorists” and “aliens” rather than 
“foreign nationals,” as they were in 2014.  
References to the migrant crime frame did not appear in the platforms of the 
mainstream Swedish parties until 2018, and only the center-right party. By 2018, the crime 
frames introduced by the Sweden Democrats in 2010 appeared verbatim in the manifesto of 
the Moderate Party. In the 2010 manifestos of the Moderate Party and Center Party, neither 
made any connection between migrants and crime. There was no reference to migrants as 
criminals in either manifesto. The Moderate Party even directly refuted the claims of the 
Sweden Democrats that migrants are the cause of crime, saying “it is poorly functioning 
systems and structures that have created these problems, not the people who have come 
here." (the Moderate Party Manifesto 2010).  
By 2014 the migrant crime frame began to become visible in the manifesto of the 
Moderate Party, but only in reference to individuals joining terrorist organizations abroad. “It 
is a serious problem that Swedish citizens are fighting abroad for terrorist organizations,” 
stated the manifesto of the Moderate Party, “they threaten not just the lives of others, they 
risk their own lives and they pose also a potential security risk after returning to Sweden” 
(2014). The party stated that migrant citizens may join terrorist organizations abroad and 
become a security threat at home. The solution presented in response is “measures, including 
further criminalization, against travel preparation for the purpose of participating in combat 
or weapons training abroad for terrorist organizations” and “the possibility of confiscating 
passports to stop such planned trips” (Moderate Party Manifesto 2014). By contrast, the 
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Center Party reinforced a commitment to open migration and did not reference a connection 
between migration and crime, stating that “an open Sweden where new people are welcome 
to become our neighbors is of great importance to us” (Center Party Manifesto 2014). 
However, the migrant crime frame introduced by the Sweden Democrats in 2010 was 
directly replicated in the 2018 manifesto of the Moderate Party. The 2018 manifesto 
referenced a “shadow society” of illegal immigrants overstaying their welcome 
"characterized by vulnerability, exploitation and crime" (Moderate Party Manifesto 2018). 
The solution was identical to that of the Sweden Democrats. “Increase the number of 
deportations and internal aliens checks carried out" (2018). "Revoke the citizenship of the 
person committing serious crimes against the state" (2018). "Crimes should more often lead 
to deportation" (2018). "Foreign nationals who have committed crimes in Sweden must serve 
[their] sentence in [their] home country" (2018). The party directly implicated migrants in a 
perceived rise in crime rates and suggested deportation, sentences served in the migrant’s 
country of origin, and citizenship revocation as solutions. These frames around migrant crime 
mirrored those of the Sweden Democrats, showing that the New Moderate party changed 
their frames around migrant crime to reflect the far-right between 2010-2018.  
The Center Party did not replicate the migrant crime frame of the Sweden Democrats 
by 2018. In 2018, they modeled the Moderate Party’s 2014 migrant crime frame, which 
referenced migrants only as potential terror suspects and emphasized criminalizing terrorism 
and ending support to terrorism. The party describes “criminalizing participation in terrorism 
organizations” and stated that the Swedish government should “increase efforts to prevent 
radicalization and support defector activities” and that “penalties for terrorism-related crimes 
must be sharpened” (Center Party Manifesto 2018). Overall, the analysis supports that only 
the center-right party incorporated the migrant crime frame introduced by the Sweden 
Democrats and only in 2018. The center party only referenced terrorism in 2014 and 2018.  
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Figure 2: Mainstreaming of Migrant Crime Frame in France and Sweden 
 
5.1.2 Frame 2: “Migrants drain welfare state”  
In 2007, the National Front used a vivid metaphor for welfare afforded to migrants, 
particularly those who immigrated as a result of family reunification, calling them “suction 
pumps for the populations of the Third World” (National Front Manifesto 2007). “The 
immigrant national and his family are not only becoming less and less deportable…they can 
claim full support from social mechanisms” (National Front Manifesto 2007). The party 
directly linked welfare available to immigrants as a cost to the French economy, saying “each 
immigrant national costs collective infrastructure four years of salary and twenty years if he 
comes with a wife and children” (National Front Manifesto 2007). As a solution, the party 
recommended France “reserve social assistance for the French. The illegals will no longer 
receive this aid which will be paid only to French citizens” (National Front Manifesto 2007). 
In 2012, the National Front echoed this framing. “Suction pumps from illegal 
immigration will be suppressed, such as State Medical Aid, reserved for illegal migrants and 
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which allows them to seek free treatment in France” (National Front Manifesto 2012). “A 
proactive action plan… [must be] implemented to identify and drastically reduce unnecessary 
and harmful expenses for [France, including the] weight of uncontrolled immigration on 
social budgets” (National Front Manifesto 2012). In 2017, this language was only slightly 
modified, requesting a reduction in immigration rates rather than a full prohibition on 
immigration. “Achieve savings by abolishing State Medical Aid reserved for illegal 
immigrants [and] combating fraud" (National Front Manifesto 2017). "Reduce legal 
immigration to an annual balance of 10,000. End automatic family reunification and 
reunification as well as the automatic acquisition of French nationality by marriage. Remove 
suction pumps from immigration" (National Front Manifesto 2017). While the extreme 
language of the 2007 frame was downplayed, the majority of the recommendations remained 
the same.  
In 2007, the UMP stated that immigration should be “based on work, not on the 
receipt of social benefits” and requested a “balanced policy that recognizes the contributions 
of immigration to our country, but within a controlled framework, compatible with our 
reception capacities (UMP Manifesto 2007). In 2012, the UMP hoped that “all French people 
must be able to express their talents without any discrimination and benefit from the same 
level of public service, whatever they are, and whatever their place of residence" (UMP 
Manifesto 2012). However, they asserted a commitment “against fraud” from “the 
‘stowaway’” (UMP Manifesto 2012). By 2017, Les Républicains’ argument against 
immigrants on welfare was also strong, stating that “the generosity of our social model is not 
without limits: a stranger just arrived in France should not benefit from social benefits 
immediately” (Les Républicains Manifesto 2017). By 2017, Les Républicains took on the 
anti-migrant frame around welfare significantly—their language becomes more similar to that 
of the National Front. In 2017, LREM did not mention welfare in relation to migrants. To 
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conclude, the welfare chauvinism frame transfers effectively to the center-right in France all 
three years of the analysis but does not transfer to the center.  
In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats framed welfare as a limited resource that is 
overused by migrant citizens at the expense of native Swedes. The party argued that migrants 
are “taking” welfare meant for Swedish citizens (Sweden Democrats Manifesto 2010). "In 
our Sweden we help people in need, but the Swedish welfare and the country's well-being 
comes first" (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 2010). To solve the problem, they suggested 
limiting access to welfare programs based on citizenship requirements. The frame is reflected 
and strengthened in the Sweden Democrats’ 2014 and 2018 manifestos. The party wanted “a 
Sweden where the law-abiding resident population is not discriminated against in healthcare 
compared to foreign citizens who stay illegally in the country" (Sweden Democrats 
Manifesto 2014). This wording was echoed in the 2018 manifesto. The party offered a 
number of solutions to this problem that largely fell under the category of limiting welfare for 
immigrants and prioritizing native Swedes.  
Importantly, the party specifically framed welfare available to migrants in opposition 
to welfare available to native Swedes. “[Reduce] societal costs and [create] strong incentives 
for responsibility and integration by limiting...immigrants' access to benefit systems during 
the first years in the country" (Sweden Democrats Manifesto 2014). "Newly arrived 
immigrants will receive help in acquiring the most basic tools for social adaptation, but 
otherwise have the same social support as native Swedes. No more no less" (Sweden 
Democrats Manifesto 2014). "Abolition of the practically free medical and dental care for 
illegal immigrants" (Sweden Democrats Manifesto 2014). "A Sweden that extends a helping 
hand to countries and people in need, but which at the same time does not forget the 
responsibility towards its own population or reduce the great needs that exist at home" 
(Sweden Democrats Manifesto 2014). “Abolish, in practice, free medical and dental care for 
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illegal immigrants and introduce clear rules for non-citizens' right to tax-financed welfare" 
(Sweden Democrats Manifesto 2018). The party argued that the state should directly tie 
citizenship status to access to welfare and limit the availability of welfare to non-citizens, 
even at the expense of improved integration, such as the Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) 
program that provides subsistence payments to migrants that allow them to take Swedish 
language and cultural classes.  
In 2010 and 2014, the center and center-right parties in Sweden maintained that 
immigration was an asset to Swedish society and that welfare programs should be available to 
immigrants. This frame changed only in 2018, and only for the center-right. In 2010, the 
Center Party discussed making welfare more available to immigrants due to their vulnerable 
status, stating that they “want to continue investing in women's entrepreneurship, not least 
among the group immigrant women" and that “the quality of teaching for immigrants [should 
be] raised” (Center Party Manifesto 2010). The Moderate Party concurred, stating that 
welfare should be available to all “regardless of whether we were born in Sweden or have 
come to Sweden from any other part of the world” (Moderate Party Manifesto 2010). These 
pro-migrant frames held in the 2014 manifestos. The Moderate Party stated in 2014 that 
“what [migrants] have in common is that they are involved and contribute to our common 
welfare, not least by five out of ten doctors, every fourth dentist and every fourth university 
teacher was born abroad” and argued that immigrants contribute, rather than take from the 
welfare pie. The Center Party concurred that welfare “must benefit everyone” and should be 
“available to the whole country” (Center Party Manifesto 2014).  
 However, by 2018 the Moderate Party transformed their stance on welfare chauvinism 
to closely mirror that of the Sweden Democrats. Rather than argue that immigrants contribute 
to the common welfare, the party framed immigrants as large “costs” “for the state and 
municipality” (Moderate Party Manifesto 2018). Solutions included "only emergency 
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assistance and emergency care should be provided persons residing in Sweden without a 
permit" (Moderate Party Manifesto 2018). "People who come to Sweden will…gradually be 
entitled to a greater degree various benefits and social benefits, instead of automatically 
access very large parts of the Swedish social insurance system" (Moderate Party Manifesto 
2018). Refugees and migrants should not be able to access special benefits to improve their 
chances of integration. Rather, "the same qualification rules shall apply to all” (Moderate 
Party Manifesto 2018). Sweden should “remove the exemptions for refugees in guarantee 
pension and sickness and activity compensation" (Moderate Party Manifesto 2018). The 
Center Party presented similar, if less harsh solutions, including a reference to citizenship as a 
requirement for accessing welfare: “full access to the Swedish welfare systems, in addition to 
care and school, should be qualified for, through work and residence time” (Center Party 
Manifesto 2014). The references to immigration as a positive benefit to Swedish society 
evaporated. However, the center party’s arguments are not strong enough to be considered 




5.1.3 Frame 3: “Migrants as a threat to cultural unity”  
 
Cultural threat framing—the idea that migrants are culturally incompatible with 
French citizens and as a result indirectly create social tension—showed up strongly in the 
2007 National Front manifesto. The frame described a “culture clash” changing the society 
for the worse and proposed a variety of solutions including abandoning multiculturalism, or 
the co-existence of divergent identities, in favor of assimilationism, which forces migrants to 
take on French culture. The party manifesto referred frequently to the “exceptional thousand-
year-old civilization” of the French, the “Fatherland” (National Front Manifesto 2007). The 
party argued that France’s national identity has been “fixed for more than two millennia” and 
is “the result of the merger of three European components: Celtic, Latin, Germanic” 
(National Front Manifesto 2007). References to a shared Western European heritage are 
Figure 3: Mainstreaming of Welfare Chauvinism Frame in France and Sweden  
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characteristic of far-right frames around cultural threat. The National Front motivated its 
audience using fear tactics, saying “if we allow our demography to collapse and replace it 
with settlement immigration, explode crime or ‘demonize’ our origins, we might as well let 
France dissolve into the globalist melting pot” (National Front Manifesto 2007). “The 
presence on French territory of more and more ethnic groups, including members who 
prioritize their community membership over their assimilation to the French model, 
ultimately poses a problem of civil peace” (National Front Manifesto 2007). 
The party leaned into the far-right extremist Great Replacement theory, stating that 
“the anti-family policy pursued for three decades has an unacknowledged but deliberate 
objective: the desire to make France disappear by limiting the number of French people to be 
born while calling on our soil a growing number of immigrant nationals” (National Front 
Manifesto 2007). It argued that the decision to welcome immigrants is made “on the grounds 
of balancing [French] pension systems” and suggests a conspiracy, which is characteristic of 
far-right extremism, saying “the date of measures hostile to the family and favorable to mass 
immigration have coincided too much for the last thirty years for it to be just a coincidence" 
(National Rally Manifesto 2007). As a solution, it suggested that France prohibit immigration 
and dual nationality and that “only citizens can vote and only those born on French soil 
[should be] citizens" (National Front Manifesto 2007). 
The National Front manifesto in 2012 largely moderated this language, but 
maintained that citizenship should be reserved for citizens born to French parents and that 
naturalized citizenship or the right to be born French should be abolished with a reform to the 
nationality code. “Naturalization [should be] earned and will be subject to conditions [such 
as] strict peaceful and prolonged presence in the territory…[after] fluency in the French 
language and proof of assimilation” (National Front Manifesto 2012). The party maintained 
the prohibition on dual citizenship and suggested that a “a major birth policy is preferable to 
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expensive and destabilizing immigration" as a solution to grow the population to keep up 
with welfare expenditures (National Front Manifesto 2012). While explicit references to a 
shared Western European heritage were not maintained, the party stated that “our heritage 
and our culture will be enhanced: the defense of heritage will be brought back to the fore, 
whether it is historical monuments or rural heritage” (National Front Manifesto 2012). In 
2017, the solutions of ending “the right to the soil,” ending dual nationality, and requiring 
demanding standards for naturalization were maintained. The party echoed the 2007 
argument that assimilation migrant integration policy was preferable to multiculturalism—
France should “promote republican assimilation,” refrain from “teaching languages and 
cultures of origin,” and “defend the national identity, values and traditions of French 
civilization” (National Front Manifesto 2017).  
In 2007, the UMP promoted “the multicultural character of French society,” stating 
“we must be determined to defend French and European culture as well as the Francophonie” 
and that diversity “strengthens our ability to influence the world” (UMP Manifesto 2007). 
The UMP hoped to link naturalization and family reunification to knowledge of French and 
“respect for Republican values” (UMP Manifesto 2007). The UMP also wanted "migrants 
who express our fundamental values: secularism, equality between men and women, role of 
family, promotion through work and education” (UMP Manifesto 2007). Overall, in 2007, the 
center-right party in France supported multiculturalism but there were traces of references to 
a cultural threat in the UMP platform, in the reference to linking migrant rights to proof of 
assimilation and an emphasis on accepting migrants who express French fundamental values. 
However, by 2012, the UMP emphasized “common values” such as “freedom, equality, 
fraternity, but also secularism [and] security” (UMP Manifesto 2012). Notably, the UMP 
wanted "to continue to link nationality and the will to be French” and “the right to vote [with] 
French or European citizenship,” both of which are frames mentioned by the far-right (UMP 
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Manifesto 2012). In 2017, the center-right discussed the “value of French cultural heritage” 
but there is no major reference to migrants as a cultural threat (Les Républicains Manifesto 
2017). LREM criticized the far-right cultural threat frame in 2017, stating that France must 
"reconnect with patriotism without giving up to our multiple histories” and “fight against 
discrimination as a national priority” (LREM Manifesto 2017). Of the center and center-right 
parties, only the UMP referenced the cultural threat frame, and only in 2012. 
The Sweden Democrats argue that “immigrants must adapt to Swedish society and not 
the other way around” (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 2010). Reducing migration is a potential 
solution, as is promoting “Swedish culture,” which is defined as a Western European 
Christian culture. According to the party, “in every Swede, the Swedish cultural heritage is 
preserved, a folk home built on a common values and the Swedes' right to develop their 
culture on their own terms" (2010). This cultural identity is marked by Christianity and “the 
central importance of ethics and Western humanism for our society, “a Sweden that is aware 
of its place in the Nordic, European, Western, Christian and human community,” as opposed 
to a Sweden characterized by multiculturalism (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 2010). 
In 2014, the Sweden Democrats described Sweden as “a country with a strong interior 
cohesion and solidarity, built on a common identity” (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 2014). By 
2014, the list of solutions of the Sweden Democrats increased beyond assimilationism to 
reducing migration, abolishing integration policy, promoting “Western European” or 
“Nordic” cultural teachings and Christianity and generally opposing Islam in both foreign and 
domestic policy. According to the Sweden Democrats, Sweden needed to undergo a “shift 
from the regular granting of permanent residence permits to temporary ones and a sharp 
reduction in the extent of asylum and immigration to a level that each society can handle and 
which is not higher than that in our neighboring countries Denmark and Finland” (Sweden 
Democrat Manifesto 2014). “Abolition of all state integration policy with the exception of 
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teaching Swedish” and “an increase in the value of citizenship through the introduction of 
language and knowledge tests and by expanding the time one must have lived in Sweden with 
impeccable conduct before an application for citizenship can be made” (Sweden Democrat 
Manifesto 2014).  
Migrants are blamed openly for a decrease in cultural cohesion by 2018, notably after 
the onset of the “migration crisis.” "Sweden is today a divided country, divided between 
immigrants and Swedes, city and country, older and younger” (Sweden Democrat Manifesto 
2018). The Sweden Democrats claimed that “very high reception of asylum seekers and 
relatives has divided the society” and “cultivated exclusion” and that “Sweden's migration 
policy has for decades been handled in an irresponsible and ignorant manner, with serious 
consequences for Swedish society” (2018). "Foreign citizens who wish to become Swedish 
should clearly show that they are ready and willing to take part in the collective responsibility 
for Sweden” (2018). “Strengthen cultural cohesion through local cultural pilots with the task 
of collecting, marketing and integrating the local cultural heritage in welfare activities and 
establishing the Sweden Center in the country's most vulnerable areas” (2018). “Expand the 
social orientation offered to immigrants and make it mandatory for everyone who receives a 
residence permit” (2018).  
The cultural threat frame is not readily taken up by the Sweden center and center-right 
political parties, even by 2018.  The parties maintained a strong commitment to a “an 
enterprising, green, secure, liberal and open society” (Center Party Manifesto 2010). They 
claimed that multiculturalism is beneficial and “new influences have enriched Sweden 
culturally, economically and cognitively throughout the ages” (Moderate Party Manifesto 
2010). In 2014, the parties acknowledged the rise of ethnonationalism but claimed to “fight 
for openness and tolerance when we see how xenophobic forces strengthen their positions” 
(Center Party Manifesto 2014) and “resist the forces that advocate protectionism and reduced 
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transparency” (Moderate Party Manifesto 2014). The Moderate Party argued that 
multiculturalism strengthens Swedish society, that “those who come to Sweden today have 
knowledge and experiences that are valuable for us” that they “add skills to our country and it 
makes it easier for companies to recruit” (Moderate Party Manifesto 2014).  
“Migrants as a threat to cultural unity” is one of the least effectively mainstreamed 
frames in Sweden—the first and second frames both transfer more effectively. The Center 
Party and the Moderates do mention integration in their manifestos, saying “integration [has 
failed],” that “education in Swedish and norms/societal behavior should be mandatory and 
start early” (Center Party Manifesto 2018) and that “integration is about more than work and 
self-sufficiency. It is also about [shared] values and community” (The Moderate Party 
Manifesto 2018). However, overall, the cultural threat frame did not effectively transfer to the 
center and center-right parties in Sweden between 2010-2018.   




5.2 Discursive Opportunities and Political Context   
Far-right parties in Sweden and France developed anti-migrant frames blaming 
migrants for the existence of several problems (a perceived increase in crime, a tenuous 
welfare state, and cultural and religious tensions). In this section I examine whether the 
transfer of these frames was influenced both by the discursive opportunity of increased 
visibility of the migration issue and differing political contexts between France and Sweden, 
with a focus on increased vote competition by the far-right. I use supplementary data to 
analyze my two hypotheses (H1: discursive opportunities, specifically visibility, led to the 
transfer of far-right frames and H2: increased political competition by far-right parties and 
the political structure of each country led to the transfer of far-right frames) to determine the 
impact of these two independent variables on frame transfer between far-right and center and 
center-right parties.  
5.2.1 Discursive Opportunities (Visibility)  
In their 2004 work, Koopmans and Olzak argued that frame theory describes how 
actors shape public opinion around events or information to achieve goals. However, the 
authors acknowledge the limitations of frame theory—frame theory does not explain which 
frames enter the mainstream and why. Discursive opportunities, or the elements of the public 
debate that determine a frame’s chances of entering the mainstream, in combination with the 
political context of each country, are crucial to understanding the mainstreaming process. In 
this analysis, I use migration data to show how the migration issue achieved the first of the 
three discursive opportunities described by Koopmans and Olzak, visibility, which may have 
influenced the ability of far-right anti-migrant frames to cross into the mainstream.  
The far-right’s anti-migrant frames were afforded visibility (how often an issue is 
talked about and how extensively it is covered in the public sphere) as a result of the increase 
in migration. High migration rates to Europe—which peaked in 2016—exacerbated and 
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highlighted the problems the far-right blamed on migration.13 The so-called “refugee crisis” 
was “one of the most heavily mediated world events of the past decade” (Trilling 2019: 1). 
As the situation developed, it “allowed certain advantages to the kind of media coverage that 
was produced…quick and clear reporting on emergency situations as they developed,” 
resulting in extensive coverage of the events (Trilling 2019: 1). “Political observers, the 
media, and politicians themselves have speculated that the refugee situation helped to fuel 
support for the far-right” by generating media coverage of frames which discussed “crimes 
conducted by refugees” or “concerns over the overall fiscal impacts of refugee immigration” 
(Steinmayr 2017: 24). As migration to France and Sweden increased, the issue of migration 
achieved visibility, creating a discursive opportunity for the far-right’s anti-migrant frames.   
To analyze the visibility of the migration issue during the time period under study, the 
following table (Figure 5) presents the yearly change in immigrants, the yearly percentage 
change, and the ratio of immigrants to population in each country between 2008 and 2019. 
 
13 Another issue impacting discursive opportunities that impacted the transfer of far-right frames was a notable 
increase in terror attacks across Europe, particularly in France in 2015. The attacks significantly impacted public 
attitudes in France. According to Byman, “after the attacks, most of the French public agreed with the statement 
that France is ‘at war’” (Byman 2019).  




These years were chosen because they correspond to the height of the so-called “migration 
crisis” (2014-2019). The data was extracted on July 1 2021 from Eurostat (2021):  
 These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in migration 
created a discursive opportunity for far-right frames through increased visibility of the 
migration issue. Between 2007 and 2016, in both Sweden and France, the total number of 
migrants entering the country increased year on year, with a dip in 2010 and 2011 for 
Sweden. The number of migrants entering both countries began to decrease in 2017 as the 
“migration crisis” came to an end (though in 2018, the rate went up in France and decreased 
again in 2019). Overall, Sweden had slightly more than double the rate of migrants compared 
to France throughout the time period studied. In 2016, the ratio is almost three times as large. 
The data reveals a steady increase in migration to France between 2009 and 2016. The 
Swedish case has a more dramatic rise, with a large 2016 peak, and later starts to drop. 
Immigration was greater in per capita terms in Sweden than France, indicating that the 
visibility of migration could have had a greater impact on the transfer of frames in Sweden, 
particularly toward the end of the period studied. The total number of immigrants in both 
countries nearly doubled and the ratio of immigrants in both countries increased by 20 
percent in the middle of the 2010s when compared to the late 2000s. Additionally, the 
number of migrants as a percentage of the population increased in both countries year on 
year, though began to taper off in France in 2017.  High numbers of migrants (in total and by 
percent of population) likely impacted the ability of anti-migrant far-right frames to be picked 
up by center and center-right political parties.    
Looking at this data from the perspective of election years, it is clear that in Sweden, 
migration rates did not begin to dramatically increase until 2016, the year prior to the 2018 
election. Migration increased somewhat prior to the 2014 election, but not as dramatically. 
The immigration issue was less important in Sweden prior to the 2010 election because the 
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increase in migration did not begin until 2014. While France’s colonial history may have 
influenced the immigration issue in the 2007 election, this thesis focuses specifically on the 
time period of the so-called “migration crisis.” Between 2010 and 2012, there was a positive 
shift in the number of migrants, but the height of the increase in migration for France was in 
2016. By the 2017 election, the numbers had started to noticeably decrease. Notably, even at 
the height of France’s increase in migration, the yearly percentage change never broke 10 
percent, while in Sweden the yearly percentage change exceeded 20 percent at its height in 
2016.  
5.2.2 Political Context  
The literature argues that political context, particularly competition over voters 
between the far-right and center and center-right parties, should influence the transfer of anti-
migrant frames in Sweden and France. Since political contexts differed based on different 
political structure and voter competition in Sweden and France, this difference between 
countries should impact the mainstreaming of frames. In this section, I present and analyze 
the vote margins of political parties in Sweden and France across three elections between 
2002 and 2018. Next, I present and analyze the GAL-TAN scores of each political party 
across the same three elections to analyze how the parties changed ideologically in relation to 
one another in the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson spatial model and determine how increased 
competition by the far-right may have impacted their movement.   
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The following table (Figure 6) presents the voting margins of mainstream political 
parties in France and Sweden between 2002-2018. Afterwards, I discuss how an increase in 
voter competition by the far-right in France and Sweden may have impacted the transfer of 
far-right frames to center and center-right parties. The data are as follows: 
First, I discuss the impact of voting margins to show trends in political competition 
related to changes in frames. While, the Front National (National Front, renamed 
Rassemblement National, or National Rally, in June 2018) did not achieve significant 
electoral success during the first decade of its existence, “between 1986 and the 2007 
presidential election [the party] consistently won between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the 
national vote” (Marthaler 2008: 384). The 1980s and 1990s saw a reconfiguration of the 
French political system from “bipolarization to ‘tripartition,’ as a result of the “strong and 
persistent presence of the far-right alongside the moderate right and left” (Marthaler 2008: 
385). Fearing the loss of voters to the National Front, the center-right initially outwardly 
refused electoral alliances with the far-right while simultaneously incorporating far-right 
frames in their platform, in an attempt to compete with the National Front while also “placing 
Figure 6: Voting Margins in France and Sweden Between 2002 and 2018 
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a cordon sanitaire around Le Pen and his party” (Marthaler 2008: 385). While mainstream 
parties frequently referenced immigration in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a minimization of the 
immigration issue in the political debate. Simultaneously, “media coverage of [confrontations 
in the banlieues and Islamic fundamentalist terror attacks] was becoming more sensationalist 
and playing a more significant role in shaping public political debate” (Marthaler 2008: 386). 
These factors resulted in a “crushing rebuke” for the mainstream in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le 
Pen “polled 17 per cent” in the presidential election, finishing just behind the precursor for 
UMP, Chirac’s party Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic), which 
received 20 percent of the vote. Le Pen was defeated by Chirac in the second-round-run off 
(Marthaler 2008: 384).  
In France, according to Marthaler, “the outcome of the 2002 presidential election 
indicated that the immigration policy of both the centre-left and centre-right was perceived by 
key sections of the electorate as being too lax” (Marthaler 2008: 387). While explicitly anti-
migrant stances had been less successful politically in the 1990s thanks to a combination of 
factors including low unemployment, the “victory of a multi-ethnic French football team in 
the World Cup,” and internal divisions weakening the National Front, the September 2001 
terror attacks “created a new anti-Muslim paranoia” that only strengthened the willingness of 
mainstream parties to incorporate anti-migrant frames to win votes (Marthaler 2008: 386; 
Davidson 2021: 1). 
In 2007, center-right candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, a former Minister of the Interior in 
the Chirac administration who had presided over “two major pieces of legislation covering 
immigration control, nationality and integration,” swept to victory with 31 percent of the vote 
in the first round and 53 percent of the vote for Sarkozy in the final run-off (Marthaler 2008: 
387). Sarkozy’s win ushered in a new era of social and fiscal conservatism and anti-migrant 
stances (Sciolino 2007). The National Front polled at 10 percent, comparatively, with the 
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Socialist party at 26 percent (Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2007). Sarkozy’s platform 
contained several elements of far-right frames promoted by Le Pen—he was accused of 
“fueling tensions” with ethno-nationalist rhetoric and demanded an aggressive police 
presence in the banlieues (Sciolino 2007: 1). Upon winning the presidency, Sarkozy diverged 
from the pro-migrant stance of the Socialist party, promising to crack down on immigration 
and creating a new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-
Development (Marthaler 2008). The Ministry’s “nationalist and xenophobic overtones” were 
“highly controversial since it made explicit what had hitherto been an implicit association 
between migrants and French national identity” (Marthaler 2008: 382). The center-right had 
successfully won back far-right voters by “addressing their concerns,” at the expense of 
normalizing far-right anti-migrant political frames and inviting “a growing acceptance of Le 
Pen’s ideas, which only 34 per cent found unacceptable in 2006 compared with 48 per cent in 
1997” (Marthaler 2008: 388). 
In hopes of making the party more competitive, Jean Le Pen’s daughter, Marine Le 
Pen, took over the party in 2011, ousting her father from power. This change marked the 
National Front’s re-entrance into the political mainstream. Her father’s inflammatory and 
provocative rhetoric, including a statement that the gas chambers used in the Holocaust were 
a “minor” historical detail, harmed the party’s reputation and prevented Jean Le Pen from 
being seriously considered as a presidential candidate in 2007 against Sarkozy (Bénard 2017: 
1). Marine Le Pen was a young leader who hoped to reinvent the party after the disappointing 
2007 result (Bénard 2017). The change was significant. “Overly radical members were 
excluded; the speeches were softened and a stronger focus was placed on social issues rather 
than immigration. In August 2015, Jean-Marie Le Pen, honorary president of the party by 
now, was expelled” (Bénard 2017: 1). The reinvented National Front was a populist, 
nationalist party stressing the harms of globalization, demanding improvements in security, 
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and promoting a social hierarchy that favored French citizens over immigrants, in an attempt 
to compete electorally with the center-right (Bénard 2017). It was a successful move—in 
2012, Marine Le Pen came third in the first round of the presidential election with 18 percent 
of the vote, compared to UMP’s 27 percent and the Socialists’ 29 percent (Ministère de 
L'Intérieur n.d. 2012).14 This result was greater than her father’s second place percentage in 
2002. 
The 2017 election marked the founding of a new party: Emanuel Macron’s La 
République En Marche, which aimed to be a centrist and socially and economically liberal 
party in favor of globalization and accepting of migration.  In 2017, Marine Le Pen finished 
with 21 percent of the vote to upstart challenger Macron with 24 percent in the first round, 
and 34 percent of the vote to La République En Marche’s 66 percent of the vote in the second 
round (Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2017).15 The center-right party, now Les Républicains, 
did not make it to the final run-off and received 20 percent of the vote in the first round. 
Macron characterized his newly formed party as “neither right nor left wing” and therefore 
succeeded in forming a broad political coalition that slowed the ascendance of the far-right in 
France, particularly in an election that came on the heels of the 2016 election of U.S. 
President Donald Trump. (Davidson 2021: 1).  
I next discuss the potential impact of voting margins as a measure of political context 
on the transfer of far-right frames in Sweden. In Sweden, a “centrist consensus” controlled 
primarily by the powerful Social Democrat party governed Sweden for “the better part of the 
twentieth century,” allowing the country to construct an elaborate and extensive welfare state 
and firmly sideline far-right elements of the political spectrum (Tomson 2020: 1).  Sweden 
 
14 In the final run-off in 2007, UMP achieved 48 percent of the vote and the Socialists achieved 52 percent of 
the vote (Ministère de L'Intérieur n.d. 2012). 
 
 
15 In 2017, UMP won 20 percent of the vote in the first round and the Socialists achieved 6 percent (Ministère 
de L'Intérieur n.d. 2017). 
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enjoyed “one of the most stable” party systems in all of Europe, characterized by the 
dominance of five mainstream parties in two major political blocs—center left and center 
right—for over sixty years (Aylott & Bolin 2018: 1). Unlike other European countries, 
including Denmark and France, in the post WWII era, Sweden had no longstanding far-right 
political party. With the exception of the short-lived success of the New Democracy party in 
the early 1990s, far-right political parties stagnated on the sidelines until the breakthrough of 
the Sweden Democrats (Bjørgo 1993: 118; Schroeder 2019).  
Despite “ties to [extremists] at its founding in 1988,” the Sweden Democrats are “now 
the third largest party in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament” (Tomson 2020: 1). The party 
entered the political stage to widespread controversy and marginalization. In the 1980s and 
90s, the Sweden Democrats had little media exposure and even fewer votes. “Most 
commentators disregarded it as an immature movement with neo-Nazi tinges”16 that had 
grown “out of skinhead and neo-Nazi circles” (Hellström et al. 2012: 187; Feder and 
Mannheimer 2017: 1). While the party claimed to be closer to the mainstream than its 
extremist counterparts, it initially made little effort to discourage this characterization, even 
electing a party chairman linked to the extremist Nordic Realm Party (Tomson 2020). 
However, like many other far-right parties in Europe, the party learned to hide its extremist 
roots to win elections, condemning images of party members wearing Nazi uniforms that 
surfaced in the 1990s and “banning the wearing of uniforms of any kind” (Tomson 2020: 1). 
The shift towards the political mainstream intensified with the election of the young, fresh-
faced Jimmie Åkesson as party leader in 2005. He quickly “expelled a stream of members for 
 
16 “Neo-Nazis are one of the main segments of the white supremacist movement in the United States and many 
other countries. They revere Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany and sometimes try to adopt some Nazi principles to 
their own times and geographic locations, though many neo-Nazis primarily adopt the trappings, symbology and 




racist statements” (Duxbury 2021: 1). The party won 3 percent of the vote in 2006, which did 
not reach the threshold for seats in the Riksdag.   
The Sweden Democrats experienced their first major groundswell of electoral support 
in 2010, breaking onto the political stage with 6 percent of the national vote (Tomson 2020). 
Initially, the Swedish mainstream created mechanisms to exclude the far-right from the 
public debate. Six major mainstream parties formed a cordon sanitaire preventing the 
Sweden Democrats “from playing the kingmaker role, which their parliamentary 
representation could have afforded them since neither the left nor the right bloc of parties 
achieved a majority” (Schroeder 2019: 68). Instead, the center-right and center-left 
mainstream parties chose to back the leadership of their former political enemies, the Social 
Democrats, to keep the far-right out of power. At this stage, the mainstream in Sweden did 
not fear the far-right. The Social Democrats maintained a firm grip on power with 30 percent 
of the vote, followed by the Moderates, the center-right, at 30 percent and the Center party, 
the center, at 6.6 percent (Valmyndigheten 2010). 
However, in just three elections, the Sweden Democrats doubled and nearly tripled 
their percent of the vote, earning 13 percent of the vote in 2014 and 17. percent in 2018 
(Henley 2018). Today, as a result of the rise of the Sweden Democrats, “neither of the 
[mainstream] blocs is anywhere near to winning its own majority” (Aylott & Bolin 2018: 1). 
Increasingly tolerant stances by mainstream policies on immigration in combination with 
discursive opportunities created by high migration rates opened the door for a new party that 
was skeptical of immigration (Aylott & Bolin 2018). As the Sweden Democrats won larger 
margins, Sweden’s mainstream parties faced an erosion of their voter base. In 2012, the 
Social Democrats saw a limited increase to 31 percent of the vote, but the Moderates’ support 
fell sharply to 23 percent (the Center Party remained steady at 6 percent) (Valmyndigheten 
2012). The Moderate Prime Minister and party leader, Fredrik Reinfeldt, lost his election and 
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rescinded his leadership of the party. As a result of the Sweden Democrats third place finish, 
at 13 percent of the vote, the mainstream had two choices: to form a center-left and center-
right coalition excluding the Sweden Democrats or for one or more parties to break ranks and 
cooperate (Aylott & Bolin 2018). The parties chose to maintain the cordon, nearly risking a 
government crisis as a result of a hung parliament (Kennedy 2018).  
In 2018, the Social Democrats fell to 28 percent of the vote, the Moderates decreased 
their percentage to 20 percent, and the Centre Party saw a small increase to 8 percent 
(Valmyndigheten 2018). In light of these results, and the significant reduction in their share 
of the vote, it is unsurprising that in 2019, the Moderate Party agreed to open talks with the 
Sweden Democrats (Milne 2019). By contrast, the centrist Liberal and Center parties, both of 
which had lost fewer votes, once again allied with the Social Democrats, openly refusing to 
form a government with the Sweden Democrats despite their standing as the Riksdag’s third 
largest party (Tomson 2020). 
But by 2021, three center-right parties: Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and 
the Liberal Party (which had backed the center-left in 2014 to halt the rise of the Sweden 
Democrats) agreed to meet with the Sweden Democrats (Duxbury 2021: 1). In the run-up to 
the 2022 elections, party leader Åkesson argues that he has consolidated enough political 
power to convince the chiefs of the three parties that “they will need his support to take 
power from Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, a Social Democrat” and to sell that support for the 
price of “policy concessions from his would-be new allies in order to secure real influence for 
his party for the first time since it entered parliament in 2010” (Duxbury 2021: 1). The 
political environment is unprecedented in Sweden, where mainstream parties had up to this 
point vocally condemned the electoral victories of the Sweden Democrats and maintained the 
cordon sanitaire. “In 2010, former Moderate Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, Sweden’s prime 
minister from 2006 until 2014, called them a “xenophobic force” and refused to discuss 
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policy with them at all (Duxbury 2021: 1). Today, the Moderate Party stands ready to 
conform its platforms to, or even possibly form a coalition with, the Sweden Democrats 
(Duxbury 2021).  
Sanandaji argues that the Sweden Democrats’ ability to capitalize on the migration 
issue is in part a result of the fact that discussing the potential downsides of migration became 
taboo among most political elites in Sweden and the political establishment on both sides 
rejected any opposition to open borders and advocated for the idea of ‘Swedish 
exceptionalism,” which was perceived as a welcoming, tolerant pro-migration platform 
(Sanandaji 2018: 1). The lack of debate over the migration issue created a political opening 
for “a new, one-issue party—belonging to neither bloc” to court the votes of a “silent 
majority” that was “never in favor of increasing migration to Sweden” (Sanandaji 2018: 1). 
As Sweden’s center-left-led government accepted greater numbers of migrants, the Sweden 
Democrats were “able to brand themselves as the country’s only legitimate anti-immigration 
voice” (Standish 2018: 1). The visibility of the migration issue during the increase in 
migration tipped the scales and created a bloc of voters, media organizations and politicians 
who opposed immigration. Voter dissatisfaction regarding migration and migrant integration 
existed prior to 2011—a platform calling for a “90 percent reduction in immigration” allowed 
the Sweden Democrats to win twenty seats out of 349 in the Riksdag in 2010 (Castle 2010: 
1). However, the introduction of hundreds of thousands of migrants, in combination with a 
political context that rewarded a migration-focused party that cut across opposing swaths of 
the voter base, ensured the ultimate success of anti-migrant frames. In 2018, the center-right 
Moderate Party lost votes to the Sweden Democrats (Standish 2018). By blaming migration 
for Sweden’s problems at a time when being anti-migrant was politically beneficial, and 
through the responsive incorporation of mainstream parties seeking to remain relevant, the 
far-right’s anti-migrant collective action frame was able to enter the mainstream. The results 
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support the argument that in both Sweden and France, increased voter competition by the far-
right impacted the transfer of far-right frames between center and center-right parties. The 
timing of the vote margins displayed above also suggests that the visibility of the migration 
issue likely boosted the vote for the far-right in both countries. In Sweden and France, the 
vote for the far right reached a high after the 2016 increase in migration. While the visibility 
of the increase in migration didn’t impact the mainstreaming of frames in 2017, there is a 
chance that any increase in visibility of the issue may impact vote margins in future elections.  
To assess how parties moved ideologically in the spatial model during the time period 
under study, I examine the GAL-TAN scores of each political party in Sweden and France 
(Bakker et. al 2015, Polk et al. 2014; Polk et. al 2017). The GAL-TAN, as described in the 
literature review, measures a spatial model of parties that was introduced to describe the 
emerging cultural issues impacting political parties and extends beyond Downs’ economics-
based model (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). GAL (green, alternative, liberal) parties 
support greater personal freedoms while TAN (traditional, authoritarian, nationalist) parties, 
support cultural conservatism and government control at the expense of personal freedoms.  
The GAL-TAN variable ranges between 0 and 10, TAN standing for 10 and GAL standing 
for 0. To assess how parties may have moved in the spatial model during elections as a result 
of increased voter competition by the far-right between 2007 and 2018, I present the 
following results. Figure 7 was extracted from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on July 1, 2021 





In assessing the GAL-TAN scores of center and center-right political parties in 
Sweden and France, the data supports trends similar to those observed in the transfer of 
frames. In France, between 2006 and 2017, the FN had a lowering TAN score over time, 
showing a move away from the extreme score (with a slight upward fluctuation in 2010). 
Meanwhile, UMP/LR stayed relatively steady over the time period under study, with a slight 
downturn in 2010 (which corresponds to a weakened Front National in the Sarkozy era) and a 
slight upturn in 2017, as the Front National entered the final presidential run-off. This result 
is congruent with the transfer of far-right frames between far-right and center-right parties. 
LR/UMP incorporated fewer far-right frames over time and had the least in 2017, and the 
party’s GAL-TAN scores remain steady over the time period. Downs’ model supports this 
conclusion, as France’s semi-presidential system and presidential run-off mimics a two-party 
system. In a two-party system, over time, parties move toward the median voter. Despite the 
Figure 7: GAL-TAN Scores of Center, Center-Right and Far-Right Political Parties in Sweden and 
France between 2002-2017 
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fact that the far-right became more politically competitive over time, FN converged toward 
the center-right party. LREM’s 2017 victory also reflects the political power of the median 
voter in France over time and the absence of far-right frames in the party’s 2017 political 
manifesto supports the conclusion that parties in France moved toward the median voter over 
time.  
In Sweden, between 2010 and 2017, the Sweden Democrats received an increasingly 
high TAN score, with a dip in 2017 prior to their largest electoral performance. The Moderate 
party experienced greater fluctuations in their GAL-TAN score than UMP/LR. The party had 
their highest scores in 2006 and 2017. This shift may indicate that between 2010 and 2014, 
when the Moderate vote percentage was still above 30 percent, the center-right in Sweden 
attempted to compete with the far-right by emphasizing the winning “open hearts” 
immigration policies pursued for so many years by the Social Democrats (and therefore the 
party’s GAL-TAN score is more similar to the Social Democrats) (Löfgren 2020). However, 
after the Moderates were rebuked with a more than 7 percent loss in 2014, the party seems to 
have responded by shifting back toward the Sweden Democrats, earning a higher GAL-TAN 
score.  
In sum, between 2007-2018 there was an increase in political competition by the far-
right in both Sweden and France (though in France, the far-right was also competitive in 2002 
and less competitive in 2007). The difference in political structure between the two countries, 
as a semi-presidential and parliamentary system respectively, influenced how the center-right 
parties shifted in response to that competition. While the highly visible discursive opportunity 
of the increase in migration in the mid-2010s impacted the transfer of frames, political 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzed how and when far-right anti-migrant frames were incorporated in 
the platforms of mainstream political parties in France and Sweden and how the discursive 
opportunity of visibility and differences in political contexts and systems impacted their 
mainstreaming. It is the hope of this author that this thesis will contribute to understanding a 
greater trend surrounding the political mainstreaming of far-right frames across Europe. 
Returning to my hypotheses, I find that both are supported by the data. Increased visibility of 
the increase in migration during the 2010s led to increased mainstream adoption of far-right 
frames by center and center-right parties. Additionally, increased political competition by the 
far-right led to increased mainstream adoption of far-right frames by center and center-right 
parties.  
In the first section of the analysis, I document that center and center-right parties in 
both Sweden and France incorporated far-right frames in their political manifestos between 
2007 and 2018. In Sweden, by 2018, two of three frames (migrant crime and welfare 
chauvinism) were incorporated by the center-right party. The third frame (cultural unity) did 
not transfer. In France, the first two frames (migrant crime and welfare chauvinism) 
transferred between the right and center-right in 2007 and 2012, and the third frame (cultural 
unity) transferred to the center-right in 2012. However, in 2017 in France, only the migrant 
crime frame transferred to the center-right. The center party in both countries did not 
incorporate far-right frames, though the center in both France and Sweden referred to 
terrorism, which is related to the migrant crime frame. 
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For the first hypothesis, the data supports that a discursive opportunity (increased 
visibility of migration) occurred in both France and Sweden. Steady increases in migration
peaking in 2016 (France) and 2016 (Sweden), made immigration a highly visible issue. 
However, increases were greater in percentage terms and in rate compared to total population 
in Sweden, suggesting even more visibility of the migration issue in that country. In Sweden, 
a dramatic increase in migrants in 2016 likely impacted the transfer of frames in the 2018 
political manifestos. In France, while the data supports that visibility of the increase in 
migration impacted the transfer of frames, the historical strength of the far-right party may 
have minimized the impact of the visibility variable. As center-right parties had competed 
with the far-right for a longer period of time, the incorporation of far-right frames has a 
longer history in France. The visibility of the migration issue in the mid 2010s therefore may 
have had a less dramatic effect on frame transfer in France.  
In regards to the impact of political context, both countries experienced increased 
competition over voters by the far-right. In Sweden, a steady increase in competition over 
voters by the far-right over time, which also corresponded to a steady increase in migration, 
caused the Moderate party to incorporate far-right frames after a political rebuke in 2014. The 
Moderate party initially hesitated to incorporate far-right frames in 2010 and 2014. In 2014, 
during the run-up to the election that the party would lose, former Moderate Party leader and 
Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt called on Swedes to “open their hearts” (Löfgren 2020: 1) 
The Sweden Democrats, by contrast, called for a “total ban on asylum seekers” (Johnson & 
Sennero 2016: 1). In 2018, after experiencing lower voting margins, the Moderate party 
finally incorporated far-right frames (migrant crime and welfare chauvinism). Today, the 
voters of the Moderate Party are in the sights of the Sweden Democrats. According to party 
leader Jimmie Åkesson, the party hopes “to tell the Moderates in particular ‘how to govern 
the country [as]…we strengthen our kingmaker role. We will have an immense influence 
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over what happens in Sweden in the coming weeks, months, years” (Henley 2018: 1). As 
supported by Downs’ theory of spatial models and Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s model, the 
center and center-right parties in Sweden ran to the right of the GAL-TAN scale, indicating 
that they moved away from the median voter, which is likely a result of Sweden’s 
parliamentary multi-party-political system. 
In France, where the far-right had been competitive for a longer period of time and 
therefore the visibility of migration was a less influential factor, the center-right and far-right 
incorporated far-right frames in 2007 and 2012, but backed off in 2017. Given the extensive 
historical background of the far-right in France, it is not surprising that the center-right party 
had already incorporated far-right frames in the first years of the analysis. Anti-migrant 
rhetoric has characterized French politics since the early 1980s. In France, mainstream parties 
had been “borrowing” from the far-right for much longer, with both center-right and center-
left candidates describing immigration as an “invasion” and warning that France had “gone 
beyond the threshold of tolerance” as early as the 1990s (Davidson 2021: 1) In terms of 
political structure, both the far-right and center-right in France decreased the frequency of 
far-right frames by 2017 (as observed in the GAL-TAN scores) even as the far-right became 
more competitive politically. The growing trend toward the median voter of the right and 
center-right (as observed in the GAL-TAN scores) could be because France’s semi-
presidential political system encouraged the far-right and center-right to run to the median 
voter in response to the far-right’s growing political power. This result is also supported by 
French political results since 2017, which show LREM incorporating far-right frames and the 
National Rally becoming more centrist.  
Today, LREM’s initial hesitance to accept anti-migrant frames in 2017 no longer 
remains the case. Macron has incorporated significant elements of his rival’s toned down 
anti-migrant frames in order to successfully compete for the median voter, a result supported 
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by Downs’ hypothesis that a semi-presidential system mimics a two-party system. While 
Macron’s 2017 victory nodded at a tolerant, welcoming stance towards migrants, he quickly 
backtracked as a result of a hostile electoral environment. Today, the two parties have nearly 
identical stances on migration, to the point where Le Pen was accused of being “soft” on 
immigration by Macron’s interior minister in February 2021 (Davidson 2021). While far-
right frames in France did not see the same rapid, dramatic acceptance as seen in the Swedish 
center-right manifestos between 2010 and 2018, in large part the mainstream in France has 
always been forced to accept and legitimize elements of an anti-migrant frame. In conclusion, 
the heightened visibility of migration in Sweden combined with a dramatic increase 
competition over voters led to the adoption of far-right frames by the center-right in 2018. In 
France, the semi-presidential structure had a moderating effect on the impact of the discursive 
opportunity caused by the increase in migration. Visibility was important, but despite an 
increase in competition by the far-right, the impact was not as strong in France as in Sweden. 
By analyzing the incorporation of anti-migrant frames in the manifestos of center and 
center-right parties in Sweden and France, I underscore the potential of far-right frames to 
become a force reckoned with by mainstream parties across Europe. This thesis had several 
limitations, including the salience of the material, the validity and replicability of the analysis 
given the personal role of the author in creating the far-right codes for the frames, and the 
lack of analysis of the role of media, which plays an essential role in the development of 
discursive opportunities. However, the mainstreaming issue is important and should be 
afforded further study. Many mainstream European parties are currently forced with the 
choice of either continuing to maintain the cordon or co-opting or incorporating the frames of 
far-right parties. Further study should analyze the role of media in the mainstreaming process, 
which plays a critical function in creating discursive opportunities or consider examining 
additional European countries, with different political contexts and political systems, to 
74 
 
analyze whether discursive opportunities such as visibility are more or less impactful 
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